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- IAC-D-57/6 Post-Mortems on NIE 63.1-55: Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956;
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
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
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IAC-D-57/60

Post-Mortem on NIE 13-57: Communist China
Through 1961, dated 19 Mar 1957 (21 Mar 1957)

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IAC-D-57/60
21 March 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 13-57:

Communist China Through 1961,

dated 19 March 1957

1. On 19 March 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

Secretary

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IAC-D-57/60
21 March 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 13-57:

Communist China Through 1961,

dated 19 March 1957

I. Findings

1. The most important single body of political and economic information on Communist China consists of official statements, broadcasts, and newspapers. This type of material is available in adequate quantity, with the exception of certain regional and local newspapers that are available, if at all, only spasmodically and after considerable delay. Most of the official material can throw considerable light on internal developments if allowances are made for certain usually fairly obvious distortions and for the Communist viewpoint of the originators and intended audience.

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IAC-D-57/60
21 March 1957

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categories should continue to receive priority attention []
[]

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a. Popular reaction to the Communist regime, particularly to the Communist drive to socialize agriculture.

b. The effectiveness of the regime's efforts to increase agricultural production.

c. The volume and quality of output in machine building, armaments, and the volume of railroads, inland water, and ocean traffic.

d. Specific detailed knowledge of the armed forces including policy and doctrine, command structure, unit organization, strength, equipment, stockpiles, training, and other military activity.

e. The relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the indigenous Communist parties in Asia.

f. Sino-Soviet relations including the formulation and communication of policy decisions, the amount and nature of Soviet economic assistance, and the role of each in furnishing guidance to the Communist parties within and without the Bloc.

g. The relations between Communist China and the non-Communist Asian countries.

II. Action

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IAC-D-57/59.3
12 November 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Progress Report by SEC on

Action Taken With Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57

1. As directed by the IAC (IAC-M-310, item 5), the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) has prepared the attached progress report. This paper up-dates and revises the earlier SEC progress report drafted pursuant to the recommendation in the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57 which the IAC reviewed on 8 October (Annex B to IAC-D-57/59.1, 19 September).

2. We propose to place this matter on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.

Secretary

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IAC-D-57/59.3
12 November 1957

SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE

6 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Progress Report on Action Pursuant to IAC
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, Soviet
Capabilities and Probable Programs in the
Guided Missile Field (IAC-D-57/59, 21 March
1957, as approved in Item 3 a, IAC-M-281)

1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph 5 of subject post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) submits the following progress report of measures taken within the SEC's purview to reduce the indicated major gaps.

2. Member agencies have continued to investigate all sources of information which could shed light on Soviet development or modification of surface ships, submarines or aircraft for transporting and launching guided missiles. While there has been little new information concerning such developments since NIE 11-5-57 was published, that which has become available tends to substantiate the statements made therein.



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/s/

Chairman

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
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IAC-D-57/59.2
27 November 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives

Attached is a revision of the draft Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives (Tab A to IAC-D-57/59.2, 5 November) which were considered by the IAC on 26 November. This revised draft, which reflects changes suggested in the course of the IAC discussion, will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 3 December, for review and approval.



Secretary

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Attachment

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TAB A

IAC-D-57/59.2

27 November 1957

Draft

*Approved by IAC,
32 Dec 57*

PRIORITY NATIONAL GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/6, (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy. The guided missile intelligence objectives below have been derived from DCID 4/6.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made between two levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these two groups has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

I. First Priority Objectives*

*as amended
by FAC,
32 Dec 1957* A. Soviet intentions, doctrine and plans to employ guided missiles particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet, ~~or~~ ^{in Chinese Communist} Satellite armed forces. (DCID 4/6, para. 1 a)

B. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities to employ guided missiles in operational units for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for defense against air attack. (DCID 4/6, para. 1 c)

C. Deployment of missiles including such factors as construction of operational sites, characteristics of such sites and associated equipment and installations, types and numbers of missiles deployed and operational readiness.

*First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).

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TAB A
IAC-D-57/59.2
27 November 1957
Draft

D. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop and produce guided missiles of all types and other components of guided missile systems suitable for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. 1 c). Particular emphasis will be placed on:

1. Characteristics of existing operational, guided missile weapon systems to include type, range, accuracy, lethality, and reliability.
2. Function and capabilities of institutes, plants and organizations engaged in the research, development, and production phases of the guided missile weapon systems and specialized auxiliary equipment.

E. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop and produce guided missiles and other components of guided missile systems suitable for defense against air attack (DCID 4/6, para. 1 c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of research and development on:

1. Surface-to-air guided missiles
2. Air-to-air guided missiles
3. Anti-ICBM guided missiles

F. The capabilities and intentions of the USSR to conduct research on, develop, produce, and employ earth satellites and space vehicles.

II. Second Priority Objectives

None.

III. Third Priority Objectives

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IAC-D-57/59.2

5 November 1957

*Superseded by
27 Nov Draft*

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Progress Report by GMIC on

Action Taken With Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57

1. Attached is a report by GMIC on "Action Taken With Respect to Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57." This paper supersedes the analogous GMIC report which was circulated previously (Annex C to IAC-D-57/59.1, 19 September) and discussed by the IAC on 8 October. Please note that Tab A comprises a revised statement of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives, prepared in the light of that IAC discussion (IAC-M-310, item 5 d).

2. This report will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting and appropriate action with respect to GMIC's recommendation that the IAC endorse Tab A as a statement of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/59.2
5 November 1957

GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

25 October 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Action Taken with Respect to Post-Mortem
on NIE 11-5-57

REFERENCE : Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, IAC-D-57/59,
21 March 1957

1. In reply to paragraph 5. a. of reference, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) has taken the following actions:

a. Has studied the existing gaps in guided missile intelligence in detail and has formulated for guidance of the collectors a compilation of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives. (See Tab A.)

b. Has recently established a subcommittee to operate in the area of guidance to collectors.



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2. In reply to paragraph 5. b. of reference, GMIC currently has no assigned responsibility for developing and applying additional collection methods. GMIC has, however, served as a mechanism in bringing advanced technical thoughts on new collection methods to the attention of groups charged with this responsibility. GMIC will, where possible, guide collectors to areas where additional collection effort might be applied.

3. In reply to paragraph 5. c. of reference, GMIC has taken the following actions:

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
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IAC-D-57/59.2

5 November 1957




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b. An ad hoc subcommittee is being established to study and recommend to GMIC methods and procedures for optimizing community exchange of guided missile intelligence information.

4. It is recommended that the IAC endorse Tab A as a statement of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives.



Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

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Attachment:
Tab A

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TAB A.

IAC-D-57/59.2

5 November 1957

PRIORITY NATIONAL GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee has derived the following guided missile intelligence objectives from DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of DCID 4/6.

3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made between two levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these two groups has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

I. First Priority Objectives*

A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop and produce guided missiles of all types and other components of guided missile systems suitable for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. 1 c). Particular emphasis will be placed on:

1. Characteristics of existing operational, guided missile weapon systems to include type, range, accuracy, lethality, and reliability.

*First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).

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TAB A

IAC-D-57/59.2

5 November 1957

2. Function and capabilities of institutes, plants and organizations engaged in the research, development, and production phases of the guided missile weapon systems and specialized auxiliary equipment.

B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop and produce guided missiles and other components of guided missile systems suitable for defense against air attack (DCID 4/6, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of research and development on:

1. Surface-to-air guided missiles
2. Air-to-air guided missiles
3. Anti-ICBM guided missiles.

II. Second Priority Objectives

None.

III. Third Priority Objectives

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IAC-D-57/59.1

19 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Progress Reports by GMIC, JAEIC and SEC Pursuant to

Recommendations in Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57,

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs

in the Guided Missile Field

1. Pursuant to recommended action in paragraph 5 of the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57 (IAC-D-57/59, 21 March 1957), as subsequently approved by the IAC (IAC-M-281, item 3), GMIC, JAEIC and SEC have prepared the attached progress reports. Since these reports pertain to the same general subject matter it was thought desirable to circulate them together rather than individually, in order that the IAC could consider them as a unit.

2. These three reports will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 24 September, for noting and any other action deemed appropriate in the light of the reports. For example, specific IAC action will be required with respect to GMIC's recommendation that the IAC endorse its proposed statement of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives. In this connection, the Board of National Estimates has reviewed these proposed objectives, as it did recently in the case of proposed objectives in other fields (IAC-M-288, item 6), and finds no inconsistencies with the over-all Priority National Intelligence Objectives. Also, please note that the Chairman of GMIC, in his covering memorandum (para. 2), states that these proposed objectives are in consonance with the "Priority National Scientific and Technical Objectives" (IAC-D-50/8) which have been previously approved by the IAC.

Secretary

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Annex A
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

3 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : [REDACTED]
Intelligence Advisory Committee

25X1A

SUBJECT : Report of Progress

REFERENCE : A. IAC-D-57/59 dated 21 March 1957, subject:
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57
B. Minutes of IAC Meeting of 30 July 1957,
Para. 5

1. Since the completion of NIE 11-2-57, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee has been endeavoring to improve both the usefulness and the reliability of national intelligence on the Soviet atomic energy program. A working group under the chairmanship of DAD/ONE is engaged in the task of preparing a draft estimate of the allocations of nuclear materials stockpiles shown in NIE 11-2-57 to various weapons and delivery systems. Steady progress is being made towards compliance with the directives of the Chairman, IAC, on 30 July 1957. Results of this group should be available to the Chairman, IAC, about 1 October.

2. In addition, the rather recent developments which indicate joint efforts between Soviet missile and warhead development and test groups have been accompanied by increased coordination and joint efforts by JAEIC and GMIC. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] A concrete result of such coordination is the report furnished to the Secretary, IAC, on 19 August.

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/s/

[REDACTED]

Secretary

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3 September 1957

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Annex B
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57,
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field (IAC-D-57/59,
21 March 1957, as approved in Item 3 a,
IAC-M-281)

1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph 5 of subject post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) submits the following progress report of measures taken within the SEC's purview to reduce the indicated major gaps.

2. Member agencies have continued to investigate all sources of information which could shed light on Soviet capabilities with respect to transporting and launching guided missiles. There has been no significant progress in the past six months in this respect. Several possible collection schemes, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
are under study but their implementation is not likely to occur in the near future. Primary responsibility for these schemes is in the guided missile intelligence effort.

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[REDACTED]

/s/

[REDACTED]

Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

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9 August 1957

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*This Annex
is superseded
by IAC-D-57/59.2
5 Nov 1957* } Annex C to
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

14 August 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC)

SUBJECT : Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57

1. In compliance with IAC-D-57/59, regarding the Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) has taken action as indicated in the attached memorandum.

2. The "Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives" proposed in Tab A of the attachment are in consonance with the proposed "Priority National Scientific and Technical Objectives" (IAC-D-50/8) and with DCID 4/6.

/s/

[Redacted Signature Box]

Lt Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

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Annex C

IAC-D-57/59.1

19 September 1957

*This Annex superseded by
IAC-D-57/59.2, 5 Nov 1957*

GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

12 August 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Action Taken with Respect to Post Mortem
on NIE 11-5-57

REFERENCE : Post Mortem on NIE 11-5-57, IAC-D-57/59,
21 March 1957

1. In reply to paragraph 5. a. of Reference, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) has taken the following actions:

a. Has studied the existing gaps in guided missile intelligence in detail and has formulated for guidance of the collectors a compilation of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives. (See Tab A.)

b. Has recently established a subcommittee to operate in the area of guidance to the collectors. A copy of the subcommittee Terms of Reference is attached hereto. (See Tab B.)

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2. In reply to paragraph 5. b. of Reference, GMIC currently has no assigned responsibility for developing and applying additional collection methods. GMIC has, however, served as a mechanism in bringing advanced technical thoughts on new collection methods to the attention of groups charged with this responsibility. GMIC will, where possible, guide collectors to areas where additional collection effort might be applied.

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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

3. In reply to paragraph 5. c. of Reference, GMIC has taken the following actions:

b. An ad hoc subcommittee is being established to study and recommend to GMIC methods and procedures for optimizing community coordination of guided missile intelligence research and production, to include (1) guide lines to govern GMIC initiated reports to the IAC; (2) circumstances and procedures whereby GMIC might publish under its own rubric; (3) methods and procedures whereby all member activities are informed on a periodic basis of community research and production projects; and (4) methods and procedures for coordinating research and production projects where appropriate. The Terms of Reference for this subcommittee are under study.

c. An ad hoc subcommittee is being established to study and recommend to GMIC methods and procedures for optimizing community exchange of guided missile intelligence information. The Terms of Reference for this subcommittee are under consideration.

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Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

4. It is recommended that IAC endorse Tab A as a statement of Priority National Guided Missile Intelligence Objectives.

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

Lt Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

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Attachments: 2
Tabs A and B

12 August 1957

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Tab A to

Annex C

IAC-D-57/59.1

19 September 1957

*This paper is superseded
by IAC-D-57/59.2
6 Nov 1957*

PRIORITY NATIONAL GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

First Priority Objectives

I. Soviet Capabilities for Nuclear Attack, using nuclear equipped weapon systems:

1. Surface-to-surface missiles of 500 nautical mile range or greater, including those with nuclear propulsion.
2. Submarine launched missiles of 200 nautical miles or greater.
3. Air-to-surface missiles of 40 nautical miles or greater.

A. Present Capability for Attack

1. Characteristics of existing operational weapon systems.
Characteristics of the weapon system include: type, range, accuracy, lethality, reliability, and vulnerability.

2. Numbers of missiles and associated launching and guidance equipment sets, in being, with production rates.

3. Characteristics of the launch bases, including site locations, launch site mobility, numbers of weapons in storage, possible targets, possible firing rate, logistical and operational features, and vulnerability.

B. Future Capability for Attack

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Tab A to
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IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

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4. Requirements, plans and intentions for future weapon systems of equal or better capabilities.

C. Preparation for Attack

Indicators of preparations to use such weapon systems against other states, beyond the normally expected precautionary measures.

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
Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

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D. Vulnerabilities

1. Susceptibility to detection, prior to employment, of the operationally ready weapon system.
2. Concentration of any critical components of the weapon systems in a few manufacturing or storage sites.



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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

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II. Soviet Capabilities for Defense Against Air Attack, using nuclear or conventionally equipped weapon systems:

1. Surface-to-air guided missiles.
2. Air-to-air guided missiles.
3. Anti-ICBM guided missiles.

A. Present Capability for Defense

Characteristics and production of existing weapon system and of the launch bases:

1. Characteristics of existing operational weapon systems.
Characteristics of the weapon system include: type, range, accuracy, lethality, reliability, and vulnerability.
2. Numbers of missiles and associated launching and guidance equipment sets, in being, with production rates.
3. Characteristics of the launch bases, including site locations, launch site mobility, numbers of weapons in storage, possible targets, possible firing rate, logistical and operational features, and vulnerability.

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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

4. Capability for development and production of warning systems, including electronic, suitable for alerting the missile air defense system in adequate time.

B. Future Capability for Defense



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4. Plans and intentions for future weapon systems of equal or better capabilities.

5. Capability for development and production of warning systems, including electronic, suitable for alerting the missile air defense system in adequate time.

6. Capability for development and production of missile guidance systems suitable for providing the guided missiles above with an adequate air defense role.

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
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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

C. Vulnerabilities

1. Susceptibility to detection, prior to employment, of the operationally ready weapon system, and the adequacy of the resultant warning time for appropriate countermeasures.



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5. Susceptibility of the launch base to air attack.

Second Priority Objectives

I. The Status of Sino-Soviet Bloc Progress in the Fields of:

- A. Solid propellants.
- B. Improved high energy liquid propellants.
- C. Advanced engines and associated components.

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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

D. Structural improvements.

E. Guidance systems, advanced in accuracy or reliability.



G. Improved warheads.

H. Improved fusing systems.

I. Research and development programs on the above topics, especially those where a large increase in potential is expected.

J. Technological developments leading to large increases in the military and economic potential.

K. Organization and control of science.

L. The general quality and quantity of the scientific and technical manpower.

M. The general quality of the scientific and technical abilities of the armed forces.

N. Future plans for technological programs.

O. Technological weaknesses, indicating vulnerabilities in regard to the above items.

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Tab A to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

II. Status of Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Capability to Support a
Major War with Regard to Items Critical to Guided Missile System
Production

A. The motivation, character, magnitude and implementation
economic programs in the following industries:

1. Electronics.
2. Precision mechanisms.
3. Chemicals.
4. Construction.
5. Transport.
6. High temperature alloys and materials.

B. The general quality and quantity of industrial manpower.

C. Industrial weaknesses, indicating vulnerabilities in the
items above.

Third Priority Objectives

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Tab B to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

(Approved 9 August 1957
Supersedes Terms of Reference
approved 5 July 1957)

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
THE GMIC SUBCOMMITTEE FOR GUIDANCE TO COLLECTORS

I. Mission

The mission of the Subcommittee for Guidance to Collectors (SGC) is to perform completed staff work for the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) in the field of guidance to collectors concerning acquisition of intelligence data on guided missiles.

II. Responsibilities

The SGC is responsible to GMIC for the following relative to providing guidance and support for the collection of guided missile intelligence:

a. Within the limits of the GMIC Terms of Reference, reviewing the scope of the collection effort to meet the objectives established by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

b. Periodically, in view of probable changing guided missile intelligence objectives and status of our knowledge, survey missile intelligence collection guidance media and advise GMIC as to the status of guided missile intelligence requirements; submit specific recommendations as deemed

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Tab B to
Annex C
IAC-D-57/59.1
19 September 1957

appropriate, which may contribute to the continued improvement of collection processes.

c. Providing staff support, when required by GMIC, for other problems in the collection guidance area.

III. Proficiencies

To discharge the responsibilities indicated above, the SGC shall acquire and maintain general knowledge in the following fields:

a. The nature and scope of the collection effort currently existing in the guided missile area. This includes not only collection techniques and devices but also guidance media furnished to the collectors, such as requirements, guides, etc.

b. The potential of proposed and planned additional collection programs.

IV. Membership and Tenure

Each GMIC member or associate member agency may designate one member and one or more alternate members to SGC. The Subcommittee Chairman shall be elected by GMIC. The Subcommittee shall function for an initial period of six months, following which GMIC will evaluate the requirement for its continued tenure.

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Copy No. _____
IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs

in the Guided Missile Field,

dated 12 March 1957

1. On 19 March 1957 the IAC noted the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," and approved the action set forth in paras. 5 and 6. (For details with respect to IAC action see IAC-M-281, item 3 a).

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957

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Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-57:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs

in the Guided Missile Field,

dated 12 March 1957

1. This estimate supersedes NIE 11-6-54, 5 October 1954, and its supplement, NIE 11-12-55, 20 December 1955. Much time and effort was expended over the past year in estimating the USSR's military requirements for guided missiles, its capabilities to develop missile systems and its intentions regarding missile production and operational employment during the next ten years. We were unable to make an estimate of production and operational programs in terms other than feasibility and reasonability. This portion of the estimate was handicapped by: lack of agreed estimates on how the USSR is likely to balance its future military programs; lack of agreed estimates on how the USSR is likely to apportion its nuclear materials stockpile among various weapons systems, and our inability to form a valid judgment thereon; our inability to predict Soviet judgments over a ten-year period regarding missiles versus other weapons systems.

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Findings

2. Major Gaps in Scientific and Technical Intelligence.

Intelligence is still insufficient to determine accurately the detailed characteristics of missile systems already known to exist, i. e., the currently-deployed Moscow surface-to-air system, short-range ballistic missiles, and air-to-surface missiles. Even greater gaps exist in the air-to-air and submarine-launched categories, and in the

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21 March 1957

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development of more advanced systems in all categories. Of particular significance is our almost total lack of firm evidence relating to Soviet development of an IRBM and an ICBM. There continues to be a need for more detailed up-to-date intelligence on Soviet guided missile research and development organizations, facilities, and personalities. An urgent requirement exists for further information on Soviet guided missile testing activities.

3. Major Gaps in Economic Intelligence. Specific evidence on Soviet missile production capabilities and facilities is extremely limited.

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4. Major Gaps in Intelligence on Operational Status and Deployment. Specific evidence is lacking on Soviet military doctrine pertaining to the current and future relationship of guided missiles to a balanced military program. We have no direct evidence of Soviet judgments as to the advantages of missiles versus other weapons systems. improved techniques for evaluating the comparative performance of the various Soviet weapons systems are needed. Although we have estimated that nine Soviet missile systems could already be operational, we have firm evidence of the deployment of only one system in one area, i. e., the surface-to-air system at Moscow. A very urgent requirement exists for collection of intelligence on the operational status and deployment of Soviet guided missile systems.

Action

5. The appropriate IAC agencies and subcommittees are requested to take the following action and report on progress to the IAC by 1 September 1957:

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IAC-D-57/59
21 March 1957

a. Continue intensive efforts to fill the gaps noted above, by exploiting to the fullest all existing intelligence collection methods;

b. Seek to develop and apply additional collection methods;

c. Study and recommend methods for improving the exploitation of available intelligence in the guided missile field, including methods for improving the community-wide coordination of effort.

6. The IAC agreed to designate an ad hoc committee to study and recommend by 1 June 1957 [REDACTED]

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IAC-D-57/57

21 February 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 12-57:

Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,

dated 19 February 1957

The attached post-mortem on NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure," which was noted by the IAC on 19 February 1957, is circulated for information and appropriate action.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/57

21 February 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 12-57:

Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,

dated 19 February 1957

The principal intelligence deficiencies noted were shortages of reliable information concerning Soviet policy intentions; the internal political situation in the Satellites, especially Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania; the loyalties of all Satellite military forces; and the scale and nature of dissidence.

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IAC-D-57/56

15 February 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 66-57:

Political Outlook for the Philippine Republic During 1957,

dated 12 February 1957

1. On 12 February 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2

IAC-D-57/56
15 February 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 66-57:

Political Outlook for the Philippine Republic During 1957,

dated 12 February 1957

I. Findings

1. Although coverage of the development of nationalism and anti-Americanism in the Philippines has increased recently, we still do not feel we have sufficient information on how deeply nationalism has penetrated Philippine society and the manner in which it is affecting the attitudes and actions of the Filipino leaders and general populace. We also do not have sufficient information on the relationship between nationalism and anti-Americanism in the Philippines.

2. Intelligence weaknesses continue with respect to the various facets of Communism in the Philippines, notably the organization and strength of the CCP and its relations with the PKP. There is also a lack of intelligence concerning the nature and extent of the relationship between the Communist parties in the Philippines and the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties.

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to take appropriate action with respect to these two intelligence gaps.

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IAC-D-57/55
1 February 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 71.1-57:

The Outlook for Morocco:

dated 29 January 1957

The attached post-mortem on NIE 71.1-57, "The Outlook for Morocco," which was noted by the IAC on 29 January 1957, is circulated for information and appropriate action.



Secretary

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
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IAC-D-57/55
1 February 1957


Post-Mortem on NIE 71.1-57:

The Outlook for Morocco:

dated 29 January 1957



Moroccan independence, however, creates additional information requirements which will have to be filled if future intelligence estimates are to attain greater precision. More comprehensive information is needed concerning the strength and internal functioning of political parties and labor organizations, especially the Istiqlal and the UMT. Additional information is required on political conditions in rural areas, such as the former northern Spanish Zone and areas south of Marrakech. Particular attention also should be devoted to other groups and forces which could seriously affect Moroccan stability, 



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IAC-D-57/54
24 January 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 34-57:

The Outlook for Iran,

dated 23 January 1957

1. On 23 January 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/54
24 January 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 34-57:

The Outlook for Iran,

dated 23 January 1957

I. Findings

[REDACTED]

we would have benefited by more information on the following points:

- a. Morale and orientation of the Iranian officer corps.
- b. The strength, character, and potential of Communist, nationalist, and other groups in active opposition to the present regime.
- c. Progress or lack of progress in economic development, particularly with regard to the Second Seven Year Plan.

II. Action

The members of the IAC are requested to take such action as they deem appropriate to deal with these problems.

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Copy No. 113
IAC-D-57/53 57/53
17 January 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on SNIE 11-6-57:

Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the

Continental US in Mid-1960,

dated 15 January 1957

1. On 15 January 1957 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/53
17 January 1957

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Post-Mortem on SNIE 11-6-57:

Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the
Continental US in Mid-1960,
dated 15 January 1957

I. Findings

1. The predecessor of this estimate was NIE 11-56, completed in March 1956. Since publication of the post-mortem of that estimate (IAC-D-57/28, 20 March 1956), there has been considerable improvement in intelligence on Soviet airfield development, and some additional intelligence on inflight refueling and guided missile submarines. Some gaps in intelligence on the performance characteristics of Soviet aircraft have been narrowed (see IAC-D-57/28.1, Revised, 4 December 1956). However, deficiencies continue to exist in intelligence on these subjects, as well as on Soviet biological and chemical warfare capabilities and Long-Range Aviation crew training and proficiency.

2. A number of other problems encountered in preparing this estimate, most notably the current and future strength of Soviet Long-Range Aviation, were essentially the same as those met in NIE 11-4-56, completed in August 1956. The general need for better intelligence on Soviet military plans and programs, noted in the post-mortem on NIE 11-4-56 (IAC-D-57/49, 20 September 1956), continues to exist.

II. Action

The IAC agencies and subcommittees are requested to take appropriate action on the intelligence deficiencies and needs described above.

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IAC-D-57/51
15 November 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 52-56:

Probable Developments in Pakistan,

dated 13 November 1956

1. On 13 November 1956 the IAC noted the attached finding and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Acting Secretary

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
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IAC-D-57/51
15 November 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 52-56:
Probable Developments in Pakistan,
dated 13 November 1956

I. Finding

No critical intelligence deficiencies were encountered in preparation of this estimate. However, we would have benefited by more detailed information on the following points:



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c. Communist relations with members of the Awami League and other parties, particularly in East Pakistan.

d. Patterns of political interest and activity in rural areas, notably in East Pakistan.

II. Action

The members of the IAC are requested to take such action as they deem appropriate to deal with these problems.

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
IAC-D-57/50
10 October 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 43-56:

The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China,
dated 9 October 1956

The attached post-mortem on NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China," which was noted by the IAC on 9 October 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate action.



WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/50
10 October 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 43-56:

The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China,

dated 9 October 1956

In the preparation of NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China," a number of intelligence gaps were revealed. The most important of these are as follows:

1. The effect of Chinese Communist propaganda directed toward Taiwan and individuals on Taiwan.
2. Power rivalries and the structure of power below Chiang Kai-shek.
3. Taiwanese-Mainlander relations.

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IAC-D-57/49
20 September 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-4-56:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of

Action Through 1961,

dated 2 August 1956

1. On 19 September 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/49

20 September 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-4-56:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of

Action Through 1961,

dated 2 August 1956

1. This estimate was approved by the IAC on 2 August 1956 after a more than usually prolonged period of coordination which began on 7 May 1956. The issues which were most difficult to resolve and occasioned the most delay were in the military field. They included: current Soviet strength in heavy bombers; the future strength of the Long-Range Air Force; the personnel strength of Soviet forces; and the likely distribution within them of estimated reductions; Soviet strategic concepts for the conduct of general war. Political and economic issues produced less fundamental divergences of views, although the shifts in Soviet internal and external policy over the last year occasioned some differences.

I. Findings

2. General. While long-standing deficiencies of intelligence on the USSR remain, there have been some gains as the result of a greater openness on the part of the Soviet leaders as well as the more extensive contacts in many fields which their current policy permits. On the whole, estimates of current Soviet strengths, capabilities, and programs as well as the intentions of the USSR over the short term are probably more soundly based than formerly. However, longer-range predictions of Soviet military developments or of Soviet intentions continue to be seriously handicapped by lack of direct evidence and lack of knowledge of the weight given various considerations by the Soviet leaders in their choice of alternative courses of action.

3. Political intelligence. The post-Stalin reforms and the greater accessibility of Soviet personalities at all levels have given us a better picture of the forces at work in Soviet society. Gaps remain with respect to the roles of top Soviet leaders and possible

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IAC-D-57/49
20 September 1956

policy differences among them, and with respect to the influence of the Party, military, managerial, and other professional elites. These gaps probably cannot be filled short of the acquisition of much more interior knowledge of the regime than we seem likely to get. However, full exploitation of information gained through the broadening contacts currently taking place is indicated.

4. The problems of long-run social and political change in the USSR exceed, in the strict sense, the limits of the five-year estimate. Nevertheless, judgments concerning Soviet developments over a longer period do in fact influence the current attitudes of policy-makers in the Western countries.

25X1

5. Estimates of Soviet intentions in external policy depend largely on deductions from the general Soviet posture. Since this seems relatively stable at present, predictions are probably fairly sound, at least for periods of a year or two. But particular maneuvers of Soviet policy cannot be anticipated without greater inside knowledge of Soviet plans, and perhaps not even then because of the opportunistic character of many Soviet actions.

25X1

6. Economic intelligence. The post-mortem of NIE 11-3-55 identified the costing of the Soviet military effort as the major weakness in economic intelligence on the USSR. The findings of the IAC Ad Hoc Military Cost Study Committee incorporated in NIE 11-4-56 represent a substantial advance in this field but still leave much to be desired in terms of definitiveness and an appreciation of margins of error involved.

25X1B

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IAC-D-57/48
12 September 1956


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 92-56:

The Outlook for Bolivia,

dated 11 September 1956

1. On 11 September 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.


WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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
IAC-D-57/48
12 September 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 92-56:

The Outlook for Bolivia,
dated 11 September 1956


I. Findings

The following intelligence deficiencies were noted in the preparation of NIE 92-56:



25X1

b. The political orientation and allegiance of the military and para-military forces, particularly in the event of a moderate-left split,



II. Action

Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for dealing with these problems.

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IAC-D-57/47
10 September 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 71.2-56:

Outlook for Algeria,
dated 5 September 1956

The attached post-mortem on NIE 71.2-56, "Outlook for Algeria," which was noted by the IAC on 5 September 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate action.


WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/47
10 September 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 71.2-56:

Outlook for Algeria,

dated 5 September 1956

The main deficiencies of information on Algeria are in the fields of the military strength and popular support of the nationalists, their arms supply, and their willingness to compromise.

[REDACTED]

25X1C

[REDACTED]

We also lack

information on the plans and activities of both the Communists and the colons.

25X1
25X1C

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IAC-D-57/46
21 August 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 28.4-56:

Outlook for Iceland,

dated 21 August 1956

1. On 21 August 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

25X1A



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2

IAC-D-57/46
21 August 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 28.4-56:

Outlook for Iceland

dated 21 August 1956

I. Findings

1. [REDACTED]

25X6

economic data are not up to date, [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Moreover,
we do not have sufficient information regarding the Communists' capabilities
to stage a coup d'etat, or regarding the probable attitudes and capabilities
of Icelanders in the event of a Communist attempt to take over Iceland by
force.

II. Action

[REDACTED]
these gaps [REDACTED] on Iceland.

25X6

25X1

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IAC-D-57/45
16 August 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E


Post-Mortem on NIE 72-56:

Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,

dated 14 August 1956

1. On 14 August 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

25X1A


WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/45
16 August 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 72-56:

Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,


dated 14 August 1956


I. Findings

1. Lack of detail in our information on opinions, attitudes and political associations of Africans in many territories makes it difficult to estimate the pace of change. The general statements to which we are confined may be valid without being useful in identifying the particular points at which trouble later develops. In evaluating the effects of rapid social change, we are particularly dependent on basic sociological and political research which is impossible for government officials to undertake and is proceeding in few places under private auspices with the scope and speed desired.

2. We lack sufficiently intimate knowledge of the intentions of native leaders, the pressures on them, and their evaluations of their positions. This deficiency is of great moment for many territories, particularly Nigeria and the Gold Coast.

3. In general, our intelligence on Tropical Africa requires bolstering with respect to (a) the opinions, attitudes, and aspirations of the native populations; (b) the extent of Communist influence; (c) political, social, and economic conditions and trends in the many territories rarely visited by American diplomatic or consular representatives; and (d) the relationships between territories, particularly how and to what degree developments in one area affect those in other areas. In addition, there is a serious lack of basic intelligence on conditions and trends in the rural areas of all territories in Tropical Africa. The following highlights major deficiencies by areas.



4. The importance of Communist influence from the  on African students and labor leaders requires closer examination.

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IAC-D-57/45
16 August 1956

25X6 More intelligence is needed on African student attitudes and organiza-
tions [redacted] African
contacts with Communists and Communist-front organizations, and
trips behind the Iron Curtain by Africans [redacted]

25X6

5. The influence of the Communist-dominated CGT in France
on African affiliates in French West and Equatorial Africa, Madagascar,
Cameroons, and Togoland must also be probed more deeply [redacted]
[redacted]

25X1

B. British West Africa

6. In order to estimate the probable response to a call by
traditional leaders in the Gold Coast for all-out resistance to the CPP
government, information is needed on the strength of traditional
loyalties among the Ashanti and the degree to which these would con-
flict with other (primarily material) interests. We also need informa-
tion on the attitudes of Northern Territories leaders which would
enable us to estimate the support they would give to any Ashanti
revolt or secession. The present effect of historic animosities and
alliances on the alignment of certain native states in the Colony,
Ashanti, and Northern Territories regions is also uncertain.

7. For Nigeria, we lack information on the attitudes and
minimum requirements of the leaders of the three regions which are
likely to determine the outcome of the forthcoming constitutional
review conference. We also need information on public opinion in
each of the regions and on the basis and strength of the opposition
elements in each region.

8. For Sierra Leone, information is needed on the activities
in the Protectorate of Marcus Grant's Labor Party and Wallace-
Johnson's Progressive Party, and of efforts by the Sierra Leone
People's Party to prevent their gaining influence there. Changes in
the authority and influence of the chiefs resulting from the tax riots
and from the role given them by the new diamond mining legislation
also need close examination.

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IAC-D-57/ 45
16 August 1956

9. For all three territories, but especially the Gold Coast, we need continued close watch on developments favorable to the growth of Communist influence, [REDACTED]

25X1A

C. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

10. Information on European attitudes and proposals relating to race relations generally and African advancement particularly will continue to be a prime requirement. The plans and strength of African organizations opposed to federation and to European dominance, such as the African National Congresses of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the existence or formation of similar organizations in Southern Rhodesia also require close attention. Information on African opinion, of both leaders and followers, toward such matters as implementation of the Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia, the program for African advancement in the Copperbelt, and the adequacy of Nyasaland's share of federal development activities will aid us to estimate more precisely the development of African resistance.

D. British East Africa

11. In Kenya, serious deficiencies exist in our information on: (a) progress in implementing the government's programs for economic development in both European and African sectors of the economy and for African advancement; (b) the response of Africans toward these projects, especially the "villagisation" program in the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu reserves; and (c) the political orientation, programs, leadership, and capabilities of district African political associations and of African and Asian organizations and groups likely to exert political influence.

12. Our intelligence for Uganda is particularly weak on: (a) the relations of the Kabaka with the Uganda nationalist groups; (b) the strength of the nationalist movement outside of Buganda; and (c) the attitudes of Africans in the rest of Uganda toward Buganda hegemony.

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IAC-D-57/45
16 August 1956

E. Belgian Congo

13. Our intelligence is deficient on the attitudes of the detribalized and semi-educated Africans in urban areas toward: (a) European settlers, businessmen, missionaries, and government administrators; and (b) the lack of opportunities for political expression.

F. French West and French Equatorial Africa

14. For future estimates we shall need fuller intelligence with respect to (a) native political development in the major component territories of the two federations; (b) the nature and extent of Communist influence in the labor movement; and (c) the progress and effects of economic development programs.

G. French Cameroons

15. We need information on the strength of nationalism as a whole, and particularly on the UPC, and on the extent of Communist influence in the UPC and the labor movement.

H. Madagascar

16. Intelligence is virtually nil on political and social conditions in Madagascar. We especially need information on nationalist and Communist activities.

I. Portuguese Colonies

17. Our information on basic social trends, African attitudes, and most aspects of the life of Africans in these territories is scanty and does not indicate where or when African resistance to Portugal rule is most likely to start. Information is particularly required on such matters as relations between Africans and Portuguese administrators and African views on government control of the sale of African-grown export crops, and on the small proportion of development activities devoted to Africans.

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IAC-D-57/45
16 August 1956

J. Liberia

18. Our need for information on Liberia extends from basic demographic and sociological data to the cliques, intrigues, plots, and shifting fortunes of the principal Americo-Liberians. Information is also needed on the degree of President Tubman's control, particularly in order to allow us to estimate the likelihood of an attempted coup or its success. The impact of economic development on the hinterland peoples is not sufficiently known and will require special attention in the next few years.

K. Ethiopia and Somalia

19. Basic information is needed with respect to: (a) political conditions in rural areas--particularly the Tigray, Ogaden, and eastern borderlands of Ethiopia; (b) the extent of discontent within the Ethiopian government, army, and Imperial Body Guard, and among young intellectuals; and (c) the strength and organization of political movements in Somalia--especially the Somali Youth League.

II. Action

Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for dealing with these problems.

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IAC-D-57/44
9 August 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 65-56:

Probable Developments in Indonesia,

dated 7 August 1956

1. On 7 August 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/44
.9 August 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 65-56:

Probable Developments in Indonesia,

dated 7 August 1956

I. Findings

In estimating the Indonesian internal situation, we continue to lack information in depth concerning:

- a. Political development in the rural areas
- b. Political trends within the major political parties
- c. The extent and nature of the relationship between Sukarno and the Communists
- d. The background, orientation, beliefs, and motivations of the principal political and military leaders
- e. The composition and strength of the principal factions within the military forces and the policies and courses of action which these factions support.

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to take appropriate action to increase the flow of information on the subjects noted above.

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IAC-D-57/43
20 July 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 91-56:


The Outlook for Argentina,

dated 17 July 1956

1. On 17 July 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/43
20 July 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 91-56:

The Outlook for Argentina,

dated 17 July 1956

I. Findings

The preparation of the section on the present political situation and of the political estimates that rested on this section was handicapped by a lack of adequate field coverage. We lack adequate information on the political ties, aspirations, and labor connections of military groups, especially the navy and "Young Officers" group of the army, and of key military personnel including high officers who have been dismissed or retired by the present regime. We also lack information on the strength and influence of the various political parties and affiliated trade union groups. Information is especially needed on the Communist Party, and on the Radical Party including the relative strength of its various factions and their military ties.

II. Action

The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to take such action as they deem essential to increase the over-all intelligence coverage of Argentina.

IAC-D-57/42
20 July 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 63-56:

Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam

Through Mid-1957,

dated 17 July 1956

The attached post-mortem on NIE 63-56, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957," which was noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate action.

25X1A

WILLIAM P. BUNDY *W. P. Bundy*
Secretary

IAC-D-57/42
20 July 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 63-56:

Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam

Through Mid-1957,

dated 17 July 1956

I. Findings

We have encountered a number of intelligence gaps in the preparation of this estimate which limit our ability to deal confidently with a number of important questions:

a. Military intelligence coverage of North Vietnam has deteriorated markedly during the past year;

25X1

Timely Order of Battle information on the Viet Minh forces is almost totally lacking and information on training and logistic activities is poor.

b. Coverage of Viet Minh paramilitary forces in South Vietnam also is unsatisfactory. The quality of the information available is such that our possible margin of error on the strength of these forces exceeds 50 percent.

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IAC-D-57/42
20 July 1956

d. Accurate information on production and trade in North Vietnam is lacking. Information on the availability of food would indicate the prevalence of mass starvation; yet we have no evidence that large numbers of deaths have occurred.

II. Action

It is requested that appropriate action be taken by the agencies concerned, particularly with respect to DRV troop movements and dispositions.

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IAC-D-57/41
20 July 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 36.2-56:

The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
dated 17 July 1956

The attached post-mortem on NIE 36.2-56, "The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies," which was noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate action.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/41
20 July 1956

Post-Mortem^{*} on NIE 36.2-56:

The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
dated 17 July 1956

The chief estimative problems encountered in this estimate were not the result of specific intelligence deficiencies but matters of general estimative judgment. They are:

a. The broad question of what will happen to Iraq's internal stability and foreign orientation after Nuri Said disappears from the scene; and

b. The extent to which Iraq's development program will in fact serve in the long run to create conditions of fundamental political stability in the kingdom.

c. Future Iraqi courses of action with respect to Syria.

* We do not consider that a validity study would be useful in the present case, since previous estimative coverage of Iraq appears piecemeal in such a wide variety of estimates on the Arab states and the Middle East as a whole that generalizations on their validity would serve little purpose.

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IAC-D-57/39
5 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE


Post-Mortem on NIE 42.2-56:

Probable Developments in North Korea

Over the Next Few Years,

dated 3 July 1956

The attached post-mortem on NIE 42.2-56, "Probable Developments in North Korea Over the Next Few Years," which was noted by the IAC on 3 July 1956, is circulated for information and appropriate action.


WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/39
5 July 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 42.2-56:
Probable Developments in North Korea
Over the Next Few Years,
dated 3 July 1956

Findings

[REDACTED]

25X1

Information collected in 1950-51, during the occupation of North Korea by UN forces, still constitutes the most reliable recent data on conditions and trends within North Korea. We are forced to rely primarily on our analysis of official Communist pronouncements for our estimates of the current political and economic developments. In typical Communist fashion, production and capacity data are announced in percentage terms referring to base years for which absolute data are either not known at all, or only available on a partial basis.

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[REDACTED]

In particular we lack detailed information on the following questions, of interest in this estimate:


[REDACTED]

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IAC-D-57/39
5 July 1956



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IAC-D-57/38
27 June 1956

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
Post-Mortem on NIE 32-56:

The Outlook for Greece,

dated 26 June 1956

1. On 26 June 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/38
27 June 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 32-56:

The Outlook for Greece,

dated 26 June 1956

I. Findings

While the essential facts were available for analysis in the preparation of this estimate, certain additional background information on internal political developments in Greece and on the Cyprus situation would have proved helpful.

a. Within Greece information on such matters as the strength and motives of the secret society within the armed forces

[REDACTED] Further intelligence on the relations between the non-Communist left and the Communists would also have been useful.

25X1

b. More definitive information on the relationships existing among the various enosis nationalist elements on Cyprus and their supporters within and outside the Greek government would have been most useful. We would also have benefited by having more detailed information on the scope and intensity of popular support for the enosis movement both on the island of Cyprus and in Greece itself.

II. Action

Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for dealing with these problems.

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IAC-D-57/37
25 June 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 36.5-56:

The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,

dated 19 June 1956

1. On 19 June 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature Box]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY^V
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/37
25 June 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 36.5-56:

The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,

dated 19 June 1956

I. Findings

1. No major intelligence deficiencies were encountered in the preparation of this estimate. The chief estimative problem--that of the outcome and implications for US interests of the political struggle likely to follow the death of the king--is one of speculative judgment, rather than one resulting from specific intelligence deficiencies.

2. While the following are not major deficiencies, this estimate would have been strengthened by:

[Redacted]

25X6

[Redacted]

25X1C

3. Future estimates on Libya, if they are to be of wider coverage than was called for in the present one, would benefit from more basic information than is now available concerning:

a. Political conditions in the countryside--

[Redacted]

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IAC-D-57/37
25 June 1956

b. The attitudes of all elements of Libyan society
toward the Libyan government.



25X1C

II. Action

The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to levy such requirements in their field as are necessary to overcome the above deficiencies.

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IAC-D-57/36
13 June 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 27.1-56:

Probable Developments in Spain,

dated 12 June 1956

1. On 12 June 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/36
13 June 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 27.1-56:
Probable Developments in Spain,
dated 12 June 1956

I. Findings

More information is needed on the following:

a. The Falange--its present position; its organization; its effectiveness in relation to the regime; its relationship to other political forces, [REDACTED]; its potential; the relative position of the opposing groups within the Falange.

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

c. The business interests--any divergent views of politically active business leaders.

d. The opposition--details on the intellectuals and labor, particularly on potential leaders and their views, and on clandestine Communist activities in labor and among the intellectuals.

e. The succession--the relative prospects of various possible successors to France.

II. Action

The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to take such action as they deem essential to increase the over-all intelligence coverage of Spain.

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IAC-D-57/35
23 May 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-56:

Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area

and Probable Courses of Action Over the Next Six Months,

dated 22 May 1956

1. On 22 May 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature Box]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY /
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/35
23 May 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-56:

Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Taiwan Straits Area
and Probable Courses of Action Over the Next Six Months,
dated 22 May 1956

I. Findings

Although our general knowledge of Communist military strength in East China appears to be good, we lack information on the extent of military stockpiling in the area, on strength of ground forces in East China, and on the status of airborne training and organization. We particularly lack timely information on the movement of military forces.

25X1C

II. Action

Individual IAC agencies are requested to take appropriate action.

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IAC-D-57/34
9 May 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 51-56:

India Over the Next Five Years,

dated 8 May 1956

1. On 8 May 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/34
9 May 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 51-56:

India Over the Next Five Years,

dated 8 May 1956

I. Findings

The following intelligence deficiencies and problems were noted in preparation of NIE 51-56, "India Over the Next Five Years":

a. Preparation of the critically important economic section of this estimate was handicapped by the lack of a consistent, organized body of statistical data on which quantitative judgments regarding the state of the economy and major trends over the last few years could be based. This deficiency is in considerable measure the result of [redacted] India's own statistics. There is also need for more precise guidance to collection agencies as to what basic statistics and studies are desired.

b. More detailed information on the present relationship between the Congress Party and the government and between various groups within the Congress Party, together with details on the efforts now being made to strengthen the party's organization at the grass roots level, would have aided us considerably in estimating the probable course of political development in India. Information on the organization and strength of other political parties is also inadequate.

c. Information is also inadequate on the degree of Communist influence and penetration in the higher levels of the Indian Government. Perhaps more important in the future will be the obtaining of information regarding Soviet influence on the Indian Government resulting from

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IAC-D-57/34
9 May 1956

grants of economic and technical assistance, trips by official Soviet visitors, and the provision of Soviet technicians.

II. Action

Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for dealing with these problems.

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IAC-D-57/33
9 May 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 100-3-56:

Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects

in Underdeveloped Areas,

dated 24 April 1956

1. On 8 May 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature Box]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/33

9 May 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 100-3-56:

Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects

in Underdeveloped Areas,

dated 24 April 1956

I. Findings

1. Instead of rehearsing the gaps observed in preparation of this paper--which would in any case largely duplicate gaps previously reported from earlier estimates--it seems more helpful in this case to set forth the key problems which the agencies had to consider in preparing the estimate. This post-mortem thus takes the form of a program of action and portrays what the agencies are endeavoring to do in this field.

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2. Listed below, therefore, are certain important problem areas, selected on the basis of their importance to the two principal estimative problems of NIE 100-3-56: (a) the motivation, qualitative and quantitative content, and duration of current Bloc tactics in the underdeveloped areas, and (b) the economic and political effects in the underdeveloped areas of Bloc tactics.

3. Key problems with respect to Bloc motivations, capabilities, and future courses of action are:

a. The extent to which Bloc economic tactics reflect:

- (1) Bloc economic requirements and
- (2) Bloc political considerations.

b. The probable level and pattern of Bloc trade with the underdeveloped areas over the next five years.

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IAC-D-57/33

9 May 1956

4. Key problems with respect to the effects of Bloc tactics in underdeveloped areas are as follows:

- a. Effect of Bloc tactics on the morale, prestige, and attractiveness of local Communist parties.
- b. Bloc performance on trade arrangements and technical assistance programs.
- c. The vigilance of the underdeveloped countries with respect to activities of the local Communists; with respect to the dangers involved in current or future commitments to the Bloc.
- d. The likely degree of economic dependence on the Bloc and the willingness of local leaders to sacrifice economic gains if faced with compromising political demands.
- e. Long-term trends in world trade and demand and trends in the attractiveness of the Bloc as a market.
- f. The relative weight of economic and other factors determining political orientation.
- g. The economic requirements for development in the underdeveloped countries and likely contribution of Bloc trade to development.

II. Action

The appropriate IAC agencies are requested to take such action as they deem essential to increase the over-all intelligence effort devoted to the underdeveloped areas and Bloc efforts to influence them, with particular attention to the problems noted above.

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IAC-D-57/30
10 April 1956


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 88-56:

Probable Developments in Colombia,

dated 10 April 1956

1. On 10 April 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/30
10 April 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 88-56

Probable Developments in Colombia,

dated 10 April 1956

I. Findings

The following intelligence deficiencies were noted in the preparation of NIE 88-56:

a. The preparation of the section dealing with subversive activities was handicapped by a lack of adequate field coverage.

[REDACTED]

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We also lack information on the government's capabilities and intentions with respect to the guerrilla problem, and on possible international Communist support for the guerrilla movement, particularly in the provision of arms and money.

b. In both the political and military sections of the paper, it would have been useful to have had additional field information on key armed forces personalities, especially with respect to their loyalties, intentions, and capabilities.

II. Action

Individual IAC members are requested to take such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate for dealing with these problems.

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IAC-D-57/29
10 April 1956


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 61-56:

Probable Developments in Burma,

dated 10 April 1956

1. On 10 April 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.


WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/29
10 April 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 61-56:
Probable Developments in Burma,
dated 10 April 1956

I. Findings

1. The most important intelligence deficiencies noted in the preparation of NIE 61-56 affect our ability to assess the reaction of Burma to current Bloc tactics. In some cases these deficiencies, involving attitudes and psychological reactions, cannot be overcome by increased collection or analysis. However, we believe that a more precise definition of the attitudes of Burmese university youth could be obtained [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We also believe that a more precise statement of Burma's economic requirements and vulnerabilities could be attained [REDACTED]

2. Although not critical to the present estimate, we lack detailed and accurate information on:

- a. Insurgent strength
- b. Plans, organization, training, and equipment of the army
- c. The BCP and the BWPP and the relations between them
- d. The impact of present Bloc tactics and propaganda on the morale of the Burmese Communist movement

II. Action

It is requested that the appropriate IAC agencies continue their efforts to overcome the deficiencies noted above.

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30 November 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : SEC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56, Soviet Gross Capa-
bilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas
Installations and Forces through Mid-1959
(IAC-D-57/28, 20 March 1956)

1. The Office of Scientific Intelligence has participated in the preparation of subject progress report and is in agreement therewith.

2. General progress has been made, through coordinated community effort, in reducing intelligence deficiencies with respect to related Soviet research and development programs and technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft. However, critical areas of insufficiency persist.

3. The Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) believes that the degree of success achieved in narrowing the intelligence gaps in NIE 11-56 may be ascertained in the post-mortems on the forthcoming related estimates, NIE 11-7-56* and NIE 11-57.**

4. For this reason the SEC recommends that the post-mortems on the respective national intelligence estimates again assess the adequacy of intelligence with respect to the two fields discussed in paragraph 2, above. I suggest that the recommended reassessment include inquiry into the following areas in which in my opinion, critical gaps remain: (a) BW and CW munitions and delivery capabilities; (b) aircraft development projects; (c) technical characteristics of Soviet aircraft, including capabilities and limitations; (d) development of in-flight refueling (e) bombing-navigation radars; (f) electronic countermeasures; and (g) development or adaptation of submarines to carry guided missiles.

Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

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* Sov. Gross Capabilities for Attack on US in Mid-1960
** Sino-Sov. Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through
Mid-1962

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
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IAC-D-57/28.1
Revised
4 December 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SEC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56

At the IAC meeting on 4 December the IAC noted this SEC progress report, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of para. 3, and approved the recommendation contained therein. Attached is a copy of this report as amended. Pursuant to the direction of the IAC, recipients of this document are requested to destroy all copies of the report distributed earlier (IAC-D-57/28.1, 27 November 1956).



Acting Secretary

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Attachment
IAC-D-57/28.1
Revised
4 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56, Soviet
Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and
Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through Mid-1959 (IAC-D-57/28, 20 March
1956)

1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph II of subject post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) submits the following progress report of measures taken by the intelligence community to improve intelligence collection, research, and analysis with regard to Soviet research and development programs and technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft.

Soviet Research and Development Programs

2. The Scientific Estimates Committee in collaboration with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee, within respective spheres of responsibility, completed the first comprehensive coordinated study on Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology, which served as the basis for NIE 11-6-56, same subject, approved by the IAC on 9 October 1956. This estimate is the first evaluation by the intelligence community of the Soviet scientific effort as a whole and of the major facets thereof in relation to the total effort.

Technical Capabilities of Soviet Aircraft

3. Air Force, Navy, Army, and CIA (a) have generally strengthened their efforts with regard to collection, research, and analysis of technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft, and (b) have concentrated and sharply focused their efforts with regard to areas of insufficiency therein. As a result, some intelligence gaps in

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Attachment
IAC-D-57/28.1
Revised
4 December 1956

this field have been narrowed, notably through the refinement of the methods used for the determination of aircraft characteristics.

4. The SEC recognizes that, although improvement is noted in all phases of intelligence on the two fields, the critical areas of insufficiency continue to exist in some form. The SEC therefore recommends that the IAC reinquire in the post-mortems of NIE 11-7-56* and NIE 11-1-57,** into intelligence deficiencies encountered in these fields during the preparation of the respective national intelligence estimates.



Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

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20 November 1956

* NIE 11-7-56, Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in Mid-1960

** NIE 11-1-57, Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through Mid-1962

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IAC-D-57/28
20 March 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56:

Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US

and Key Overseas Installations and Forces

Through Mid-1959,

dated 6 March 1956

1. On 20 March 1956 the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-57/28
20 March 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-56:

Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US

and Key Overseas Installations and Forces

Through Mid-1959,

dated 6 March 1956

I. Findings

1. This estimate is essentially an updating of NIE 11-7-55, completed in July 1955. The primary intelligence deficiencies noted in the post-mortem on NIE 11-7-55 (IAC-D-57/8, 23 August 1955) still exist, and little progress has been made in overcoming them during the intervening six months. In summary these deficiencies are: lack of adequate intelligence on Soviet research and development programs, on production of major weapons, on training in the Soviet Long-Range Air Force, on airfield developments and capacities, and on technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft. The USSR is apparently developing guided missiles on a rapidly increasing scale; although more evidence is now available than formerly, intelligence is still deficient in this field as well.

2. Finally, it should be noted that a general weakness of this paper, and its predecessors, stems from the lack of any agreed analysis of Soviet strategic concepts, which would assist in estimating the manner in which the USSR is likely to allocate its resources among various weapons systems in order to satisfy its operational requirements. An initial effort in this direction was approved by the IAC for the 1956 version of the over-all Soviet estimate. (See the Post-Mortem on 11-3-55 in IAC-D-57/7, 16 August 1955.)

II. Action

It is requested that the appropriate agencies or IAC subcommittees pursue vigorously the collection, research, and analysis recommended in this post-mortem and in the post-mortem on NIE 11-7-55, and report on progress made to the IAC by 15 October 1956.

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IAC-D-57/26
7 February 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 42.1-56:

Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea

Through Mid-1957,

dated 7 February 1956

1. On 7 February 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/26
7 February 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 42.1-56:

Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea

Through Mid-1957,

dated 7 February 1956

I. Findings

Preparation of this estimate was not critically handicapped by intelligence gaps. The most difficult estimative problems are those involving the ROK's actions with respect to North Korea and developments following the death of Rhee. Since developments following Rhee's death may lead to the emergence of new leaders and alignments it is important that information on the thinking, motivations, and strength of all potential leaders including major military commanders be developed. The attitudes and loyalties of several large groups in the population such as the peasants and common soldiers deserve continuing scrutiny. Although we believe that these groups are largely passive with respect to political developments, they might become of increasing importance over the next few years.

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to note these findings and take appropriate action.

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IAC-D-57/25
7 February 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 24-56:

The Political Outlook in Italy,

dated 7 February 1956

1. On 7 February 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/25
7 February 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 24-56:
The Political Outlook in Italy,
dated 7 February 1956

I. Findings

1.

Existing intelligence deficiencies have not significantly affected our ability to estimate the over-all situation and the broad lines of future political developments.

2. However, because of the extremely fluid domestic political situation, we need additional information on matters such as trends in policy, strength, and leadership of the Communist party and of the Christian Democratic party; the attitudes of Nenni, and of other Nenni Socialist party members, with respect to center-left cooperation and with respect to the Communist-Nenni Socialist alliance; and, in general, developments bearing on the so-called "opening to the left."

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to note the above deficiencies and take appropriate action.

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IAC-D-57/24
24 January 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 64-56:

The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960,

dated 24 January 1956

1. On 24 January 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/24
24 January 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 64-56:

The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960,
dated 24 January 1956

I. Findings

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] detailed information is spotty on indigenous organizations and their activities, particularly in Singapore. Moreover, the extent of Communist strength has not been precisely determined in either the Federation or Singapore; and information is inadequate both on the organization of PAP and on the question of the extent and nature of Communist strength within PAP.

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II. Action

Intelligence organizations of the IAC are requested to take appropriate remedial action.

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IAC-D-57/23
10 January 1956

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
Post-Mortem on NIE 12-56:

Probable Developments in the European Satellites

Through 1960,

dated 10 January 1956

1. On 10 January 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2

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IAC-D-57/23
10 January 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 12-56:

Probable Developments in the European Satellites

Through 1960,

dated 10 January 1956

I. Findings

1. NIE 12-56, the annual estimate of trends in the European Satellites, was coordinated without major delays or serious disagreement. The principal differences centered around questions of judgment: (a) whether Soviet leaders might be considering some modification in the essentially coercive nature of their control over the Satellites; (b) how far Soviet relations with Yugoslavia, China, or the neutralist states may have a bearing on Moscow's policy in the Satellites; (c) to what extent coordination of the Satellite economies would be effective; (d) the extent of disaffection among the Satellite populations; and (e) to what extent the Satellite armed forces could be employed in the event of general war.

2. While most of the difficulties encountered in the preparation and coordination of NIE 12-56 were the result of long-standing deficiencies of data on the Satellites, the course of coordination made clear that, currently, a significant gap in our knowledge of the Satellites concerns the Satellite Communist parties. Specifically, we do not know enough concerning the character, size, and influence of various factions and divisions within the Satellite parties. It is not clear in what way divisions within the Soviet regime are reflected in shifts in Satellite leadership and policies. The extent to which factions within the Satellite parties are desirous of imitating Tito also needs illumination.

II. Action

It is recommended that a Satellite equivalent of the study be undertaken in the form of a pilot study dealing with possible factions in the Czechoslovak Communist party.

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
IAC-D-57/22
5 January 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 13-56:

Chinese Communist Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,
dated 5 January 1956

1. On 5 January 1956, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2

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IAC-D-57/22
5 January 1956

Post-Mortem on NIE 13-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,
dated 5 January 1956

I. Findings

1. We are still dependent in large measure on Chinese Communist radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, and official announcements for information concerning developments in Communist China. While our ability to crosscheck the consistency of data has improved, we are able to evaluate such material, in most instances, only in a general way

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2. Within the general intelligence deficiency concerning Communist China, we believe the following specific categories to be the more important:

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a. The popular reaction to the Communist regime and, particularly, to the Communist drive to socialize agriculture.

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d. Sino-Soviet relations including:

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IAC-D-57/22
5 January 1956

(1) Formulation and communication of policy decisions.

(2) Amount and nature of Soviet economic assistance.

(3) The nature of guidance to the Communist parties in other Asian countries and the respective roles of Communist China and the Soviet Union in this field.

e. Training, morale, logistics, unit organization and location, and the progress of the re-equipment program of the military forces. In addition, information on the command structure and the operation of the newly instituted system of military conscription.

f. The effectiveness with which the Chinese Communists develop and execute complex industrial projects. The volume and quality of production in heavy industry with special emphasis on machine building, armaments, steel, and petroleum.

g. Capacity and utilization of all forms of transportation and details of their component factors, particularly the size and production of railroad rolling stock.

h. Information on the price structure particularly with respect to equipment and producer goods.

i. Trends in diet and the standard of living both urban and rural.

j. The number and quality of graduates from secondary schools and colleges, particularly in technical fields.


3. The above items relate directly to the sectors of the Chinese Communist society which were considered in NIE 13-56 to be the most critical relative to the Communist objectives of

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IAC-D-57/22
5 January 1956

achieving economic progress and strengthening the regime's control over the Chinese people. As we move further away from 1949 and from intelligence on China based directly on non-Communist sources, our estimates of Communist strength and weaknesses will become increasingly dependent on Chinese Communist official sources.



II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to examine their collection effort to see what can be done to reduce the above described gaps.



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IAC-D-57/20
7 December 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa,

dated 29 November 1955

1. On 6 December 1955, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2004/07/09 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500030001-2

IAC-D-57/20

7 December 1955

Post-Mortem on NIE 71-55:

Probable Developments in French North Africa,

dated 29 November 1955

I. Findings

1. Our chief need is for additional intelligence on the nationalist movements in the area, particularly in French Morocco and Algeria. We need details on: (a) the capabilities, leadership, and policies of the various nationalist movements, especially the Istiqlal and the CRUA; (b) extremist groups and their relationships with the recognized nationalist parties; (c) cooperation or rivalry between nationalist leaders both within and outside French North Africa; (d) the role and composition of nationalist committees outside North Africa; (e) the degree to which tribal organizations are being affected by nationalism; and (f) the sources and levels of external assistance for the nationalists including arms, equipment, personnel, and training.

2. Since the Communists will probably expand their activities in French North Africa, we will require increasing intelligence on the strength and capabilities of the Communist parties in all three areas. In particular, we will need information on the extent of cooperation between the Communists and the nationalist movements.

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to intensify their efforts to overcome the intelligence deficiencies listed above.

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IAC-D-57/17
15 November 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 43-55:

The Prospects for the Chinese Nationalist Government,

dated 1 November 1955

1. On 15 November 1955, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Acting Secretary

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IAC-D-57/17
15 November 1955

Post-Mortem on NIE 43-55:

The Prospects for the Chinese Nationalist Government,
dated 1 November 1955

I. Findings

[REDACTED]

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However, our estimates could be strengthened by fuller and more specific information on the extent and nature of Communist subversive efforts, [REDACTED] and by more positive information on the state of civilian morale on Taiwan, especially among officials. There is also a need for more complete information on the basic attitudes and views of Nationalist leaders, on Taiwanese-mainlander relations, and on specific economic matters, particularly a sound GNP calculation. Our ability to judge Taiwan's economic growth and prospects is also hampered by inadequate data on the size, structure, rate of growth, and employment pattern of the population.

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II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to continue and intensify their efforts to obtain the indicated information.

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IAC-D-57/16
18 October 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 63.1-3-55:

Probable Developments in South Vietnam to July 1956,

dated 11 October 1955

1. On 18 October 1955, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Acting Secretary

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IAC-D-57/16
18 October 1955

Post-Mortem on NIE 63.1-3-55:

Probable Developments in South Vietnam to July 1956,
dated 11 October 1955

I. Findings

In the preparation of this estimate the Board of National Estimates and the IAC representatives found that there continue to be serious intelligence deficiencies with respect to Viet Minh capabilities and intentions. In particular, there is little reliable information concerning: the size and most important areas of concentration of Viet Minh political and military cadres in South Vietnam; the extent of Viet Minh political influence in rural and urban areas; and the extent to which the Viet Minh may have infiltrated or have reached understanding with non-Communist opposition groups in South Vietnam, especially the sect groups remaining in dissidence.

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to intensify their collection efforts to close the serious gaps cited above.

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
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IAC-D-57/14

7 September 1955

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-55 Probable Intelligence

Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through

Mid-1958, dated 1 July 1955

1. On 7 September, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in section II.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/14

7 September 1955

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Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-55: Probable Intelligence

Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through

Mid-1953, dated 1 July 1955

I. Findings

1. NIE 11-6-55, approved by the IAC on 1 July 1955, was essentially an updating of the previous warning estimate, SNIE 11-8-54. In coordinating this estimate primary disagreement continued to center around the degree of specific advance warning intelligence was likely to provide under various scales of air attack. On one point the Air Force entered a formal dissent. Disagreement stemmed primarily from divergences in view as to the current and probable future Soviet capabilities for surprise air attack, and the nature and extent of the problems inherent in interpreting warning indicators.

2. In many respects this NIE involves questions of judgment or estimates of future capabilities upon which little or no factual evidence can be brought to bear. However, there are certain significant intelligence deficiencies, particularly as regards the nature and quality of training (including inflight refueling), the nature and extent of activity in forward base areas, and the status of forward air base development which bear upon the vital question of Soviet operational readiness, methods, and effectiveness and thus upon Soviet capability for surprise attack. Further intensification of the already vigorous intelligence efforts in these fields may result in some further narrowing of the intelligence gaps, although, short of a major change in Soviet security practice or some intelligence breakthrough, no dramatic improvement is to be expected.

3. To estimate the probable degree of advance warning that could be provided by intelligence it is essential that all relevant techniques and capabilities, current and prospective, be carefully considered. Written contributions from the government organizations probably best able to supply such technical information, including special intelligence, should be requested. Moreover, since the nature and degree of warning depends in large part on the performances of these organizations, these contributions should include an evaluation of their operational capabilities.

4. The nature and degree of warning is also affected by operational factors, [redacted]

[redacted] which were not fully explored.

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II. Action

When estimates of probable intelligence warning are under consideration:

- a. That the Watch Committee when appropriate (1) submit written contributions covering technical information and an evaluation of their operational capabilities, and (2) provide consultative participation by members of its staff as appropriate;
- b. That NSA be asked, when appropriate, to continue to provide consultants, who would participate more fully than in the past at the IAC representatives level [REDACTED]
- c. That an effort be made to determine what contribution to warning might be made [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] under various degrees of tension.

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IAC-D-57/13
7 September 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem on NIE 31 Series

1. On 7 September, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in paragraph 4.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



Secretary

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IAC-D-57/13
7 September 1955

POST-MORTEM ON NIE 31 SERIES

1. Coverage. This is a post-mortem on NIE 31-55, "Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation," 23 February 1955, NIE 31/1-55, "Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation," 19 May 1955; and NIE 31-2-55, "Yugoslavia's International Position," 7 September 1955.
2. Findings. Since NIE 31-55 and NIE 31/1-55 cover the same ground, and NIE 31-2-55 overlaps these earlier estimates to a considerable extent, the intelligence deficiencies encountered in the preparation of all three were much the same. The deficiencies stem primarily from the secretiveness and aloofness of Yugoslav officials in their contacts with representatives of Western powers.
3. The most important of these intelligence deficiencies, both relating to key estimative questions, were:
 - a. A lack of reliable intelligence on relationships between the Yugoslav regime and party on the one hand, and those of the Soviet Bloc on the other.
 - b. A similar lack with respect to relationships within the Yugoslav ruling group, particularly as these bear on the regime's foreign policy toward the Bloc and the West. Although we feel safe in estimating that a pro-Soviet element exists in Yugoslavia, we have little intelligence on its present or potential influence.
4. Action. That the IAC agencies continue systematic efforts to collect and analyze data bearing on:
 - a. Yugoslav-Bloc relations; and
 - b. Relationships within the Yugoslav regime and party, particularly as they may affect Yugoslavia's international position.

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IAC-D-57/12
6 September 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Procedure for the Post-Production Review
of National Intelligence Estimates

1. Purpose

This paper sets forth the general procedure for reviewing the performance of the intelligence community in producing national intelligence estimates in order to take remedial action if such is required.

2. Policy

The IAC shall:

- a. Review each estimate immediately to identify the intelligence deficiencies encountered by the estimators during its preparation; and
- b. Review each estimate after the lapse of an appropriate interval to determine its validity, i.e., how good the estimate was in the light of subsequent developments.

3. Responsibility for Initiating Action

The Board of National Estimates is responsible for initiating action, but the IAC agencies may request alternative action if they do not agree with the action proposed by the Board.

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4. Procedure on Deficiencies

a. Post-mortem findings are simply a statement of intelligence deficiencies or gaps. These can be (a) substantive--lack of adequate data; or (b) procedural, e.g., insufficient analytical effort on certain subjects. Findings will usually be confined to statements of such deficiencies, in which case action recommended will be to enjoin the intelligence community to take appropriate steps to reduce the deficiencies noted. In other cases specific remedial action will be set forth, specific as to what is to be done or as to what agency shall do it.

b. The IAC agencies will include in their contributions to NIE's a statement of the deficiencies (substantive or procedural), if any, encountered during the preparation of the contributions.

c. The Board will incorporate a section on the findings together with recommended remedial action in the draft estimate. Agreement on this statement will be sought just as in the case of the estimate itself.

d. The IAC will note the findings agreed upon and will act on recommendations made.

e. Subsequent to IAC action, the Secretary of the IAC will circulate the findings noted and the action to be taken by the intelligence community.

f. In those cases where it is clear that few intelligence deficiencies of a sort justifying a post-mortem exist, the Board will

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IAC-D-57/12

6 September 1955

so inform the IAC representatives and seek agreement to so advise the IAC. In such cases the IAC would be notified, and the matter be made a part of the record, by the inclusion of a Secretary's Note in the current IAC minutes.

g. In those cases where a detailed post-mortem is required, or the estimate would be delayed because of an attempt to complete action on the post-mortem when the estimate is up for approval, the Board will prepare a separate post-mortem and the findings and recommendations will be coordinated subsequent to the completion of the estimate.

5. Procedure on Validation

a. Whenever an estimate is revised, the contributing agencies will be requested to submit a critique of the previous estimate together with their regular contribution. These critiques will be consolidated by the Board of National Estimates and coordinated with the IAC representatives. These will then be noted by the IAC and circulated by the Secretary of the IAC for information.

b. In instances where estimates are revised only infrequently, a validity study may be undertaken at any time upon the initiative of the Board of National Estimates or at the request of any one of the IAC agencies.

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IAC-D-57/12

6 September 1955

c. Whenever, in the judgment of the Board of National Estimates, the subject-matter of a national estimate or the period it is designed to cover render a validity study infeasible, the Board may elect not to undertake such a study provided no objection is raised by one of the IAC agencies.

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IAC-D-57/11
30 August 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE
SINO-SOVIET BLOC

1. On 30 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and reconstituted the Resistance Intelligence Committee under the chairmanship of the Department of State.
2. The Department of State has designated Mr. Boris Klosson as its representative and chairman of the RIC.
3. IAC intelligence organizations are hereby requested to take appropriate action to close specific intelligence gaps and to support the work of the RIC.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/10
23 August 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 100-5-55: Implications of
Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist
Bloc and the Free World

1. The attached post-mortem findings were noted by the IAC on 23 August.
2. The attention of recipients is in particular called to paragraph 4.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/10
23 August 1955

POST-MORTEM ON NIE 100-5-55: IMPLICATIONS OF
GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES FOR THE
COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD

FINDINGS

1. Since NIE 100-5-55 dealt so largely with questions of judgment and longer range estimates, it is difficult to assess the extent of intelligence gaps. However, there is a continuing growth in both the volume and the scope of information available on public and official attitudes toward nuclear problems which provide valuable background for estimates like those made in NIE 100-5-55. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Much of this data was assembled but there was still a relative paucity of sufficiently concrete evidence upon which estimates could be based. Another major difficulty was a general lack of organization in the material available throughout the agencies.

2. Because nuclear developments will have an increasingly important impact on the course of foreign policy, it is essential to accelerate, expand, and systematize the collection of pertinent material. In general, the collection effort should be a continuing process and include any data bearing on the effect of increasing nuclear capabilities on public attitudes and national policies of Free World, Communist Bloc, and so-called neutral or independent countries. Emphasis should be on intelligence having broad implications for foreign and military policy. [REDACTED]

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3. Among the information which would be particularly useful would be that related to the effects of nuclear developments on foreign public attitudes and the policies of foreign governments with respect to:

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IAC-D-57/10
23 August 1955

- (a) general foreign policy objectives and tactics
- (b) publicity and propaganda
- (c) increased or decreased risk of war
- (d) evaluation of alliance systems
- (e) neutralist or isolationist tendencies
- (f) increased boldness or caution in foreign policy
- (g) instigation of or intervention in local conflicts and local aggression
- (h) approval of the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons
- (i) necessity for nonnuclear powers to develop their own nuclear capabilities
- (j) general disarmament and international agreements restricting or controlling production, testing, or employment of nuclear weapons
- (k) health and genetic effects of nuclear explosions
- (l) prospect for employment of and reaction to attempted nuclear "blackmail"
- (m) further development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy
- (n) assessment of balance of military power
- (o) military organization, emphasis, deployment, and doctrine
- (p) levels and types of armament and military expenditures
- (q) development of offensive and defensive capabilities (including both weapons and delivery capabilities)

ACTION

4. It would greatly facilitate the thorough and timely consideration of the above factors in relevant national estimates if the agencies and CIA offices in a position to collect and analyze such data would make a systematic and continuing effort to do so.

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IAC-D-57/9.2
17 July 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Progress Reports on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55, "Air Defense
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960"

References: IAC-D-57/9, 23 August 1955
IAC-D-57/9.1, 23 December 1955

1. Attached are copies of reports on progress made in overcoming certain intelligence deficiencies in the electronics field, prepared by the Scientific Estimates Committee and the Economic Intelligence Committee, pursuant to the direction of the IAC in connection with its approval of the Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55 (IAC-D-57/9, 23 August 1955, para. 5). An interim report by the EIC on the same subject has been circulated for information previously (IAC-D-57/9.1, 23 December 1955).

2. These reports will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting.

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[Redacted Signature Box]

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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Attachment 1 to
IAC-D-57/9.2
17 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to IAC Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55, Air
Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960
(IAC-D-57/9, 23 August 1955)

1. In compliance with its responsibilities under paragraph 5 of subject IAC post-mortem, the Scientific Estimates Committee submits the following progress report of measures taken by the intelligence community to overcome intelligence deficiencies with respect to probable operational capabilities of Soviet radars.

2. It has been found difficult to obtain complete agreement of technical experts on the operational performance of any radars, including US radars whose characteristics are accurately known. Nevertheless SEC members are in unanimous agreement on the pressing need to determine the performance characteristics of Soviet radars to the greatest possible extent. Accordingly, the SEC acted in January 1956 to sponsor a coordinated, all-source research program on Soviet radars. The program consists of two phases: (a) community agreement on assumptions of parameters to be used in estimating radar characteristics, and (b) production of an agreed estimate of operational capabilities of Soviet radars. The SEC will endeavor to complete this study during the current quarter of Calendar Year 1956. It is anticipated that a community position on Soviet radars will be achieved by this means in ample time for the next NIE on Sino-Soviet Air Defense, now scheduled for the first quarter of Calendar Year 1957.

3. In addition to their active participation in the SEC-sponsored program described above, Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA report a general strengthening of their collective and individual research efforts with regard to Soviet radars. These member agencies have also intensified their efforts to improve the quality and scope of intelligence



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Attachment 1 to
IAC-D-57/9.2
17 July 1956

collection with regard to Soviet radars by (a) increasing emphasis on the development and circulation of coordinated information requirements on Soviet radars;

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Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

3 July 1956

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Attachment 2 to
IAC-D-57/9.2
17 July 1956

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

12 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : EIC Responsibilities under Post Mortem of
NIE 11-5-55, IAC-D-57/9 of 23 August 1955,
[REDACTED]

REFERENCE : EIC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant
to Post Mortem on Soviet Air Defense Estimate,
IAC-D-57/9.1, 23 December 1955

1. The subject paper directed the EIC to review community research efforts related to "probable costs of Soviet radar and other electronics".

2. On 23 December 1955 the EIC reported to the IAC that an expanded economic research program for FY 1956 had already been initiated by the IAC Agencies engaged in research on Soviet Bloc electronics, and that this current program is as comprehensive as can be supported by presently available information. The EIC also indicated that it would follow the current program closely and report further towards the close of the fiscal year--indicating the extent to which the programmed research had been successful in closing priority intelligence gaps.

3. Because of the security surrounding this industry in the Bloc, collection of information on costs has not been greatly improved. Some intelligence reports concerning this deficiency have been completed during the past six months. The military intelligence agencies have completed projects which provide basic data related to the costs of radar and other electronics, for example, [REDACTED]


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Attachment 2 to
IAC-D-57/9.2
17 July 1956



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More data, however, will be required before this priority intelligence gap can be successfully closed.

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Chairman

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IAC-D-57/9.1
23 December 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

EIC Progress Report on Action Taken Pursuant to
Post-Mortem on Soviet Air Defense Estimate

The attached report of the Economic Intelligence Committee on the progress being made on discharging EIC responsibilities assigned under IAC-D-57/9 is circulated for information.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/9.1
23 December 1955

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

23 December 1955

TO : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT: EIC Responsibilities under Post-Mortem of NIE 11-5-55,
IAC-D-57/9 of 23 August 1955,

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1. The subject paper directed the EIC to review community research efforts related to "probable costs of Soviet radar and other electronics." Accordingly, the EIC requested its Subcommittee on Electronics and Telecommunications to explore and report to it on the situation.

2. The EIC has itself been aware for some time of the inadequacies of available finished intelligence on this area of Soviet production. An expanded economic research program for FY 1956 had already been initiated by the IAC agencies engaged in research on Soviet Bloc electronics prior to receipt of the IAC post-mortem.* In addition, another major project has been laid on more recently in CIA/ORR, which will include cost estimates and operating data on Sino-Soviet Bloc radar facilities.

3. In the view of the EIC, after consulting its technical subcommittee in this field, this current program is as comprehensive as can be supported by presently available information.



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IAC-D-57/9.1
23 December 1955

If further expansion of research in this field is desired, it will require additional collection--particularly fuller information on equipment characteristics.

4. The EIC will follow this program closely and report further towards the close of the current fiscal year--indicating the extent to which this programmed research has been successful in closing priority intelligence gaps.

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Chairman

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IAC-D-57/9
23 August 1955



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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-5-55: Air Defense of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960

1. On 23 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in paragraph 5.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.



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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/9
23 August 1955

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**POST MORTEM ON NIE 11-5-55: AIR DEFENSE OF THE
SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955-1960**

1. NIE 11-5-55, approved by the IAC on 12 July 1955, was approximately six months in preparation. To provide a logical and systematic approach to a complex and bulky NIE of this type, it was produced in four separate steps using ad hoc interagency committees in three preliminary stages. The three committees prepared successively: (a) an estimate of Bloc air defense requirements; (b) an estimate of present and future air defense equipment, forces, and capabilities of the Bloc as determined by available intelligence; and (c) an estimate of the cost of the program estimated in Step Two, as well as of the economic capabilities of the Bloc to provide such an air defense system. Finally, agency representatives coordinated in the usual way a draft prepared by O/NE on the basis of contributions produced by the three committees. This method was a further refinement of that used initially in preparing NIE 11-6-54 on guided missiles.

I. FINDINGS

2. Certain difficulties were encountered in the committee method of preparing this estimate. It proved impractical and in some respects would probably have been undesirable to obtain complete interagency concurrence for the committee contributions. However, a large degree of concurrence was obtained informally at the committee level, which assisted greatly in the subsequent review of the estimate by the IAC Representatives. There was some lack of consistency in the interpretation of requirements by the various committees, leading to different positions being taken by the same agency in these committees. This made the reconciliation of differing views time-consuming in the final stages of the estimate.

3. Nevertheless, the step-by-step committee approach facilitated the preparation of the estimate and is a technique which should continue to be used where appropriate. However, this process requires that each agency's representatives on the various committees should be completely familiar with the process of producing national estimates and fully coordinate their approaches to the problem.

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23 August 1955
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25X1 4. The many intelligence deficiencies encountered in this estimate are not likely to be fully overcome short of major changes in Bloc security practices or some unexpected breakthrough by intelligence. Deficiencies continue to exist in weapons research, development, and production, deployment of equipment and forces, technical capabilities of weapons, training programs and combat readiness, and economic costs and capabilities in particular fields. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] There was a divergence of opinion as to the probable performance of Bloc radar under operational conditions. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] In addition our data on the rate of production and on the probable costs of electronics equipment is weak. An effort to produce more comprehensive special studies on the technical capabilities of Bloc air defense equipment might help to fill the present gaps in intelligence.

II. ACTION

5. That the agencies with primary responsibility in the electronics fields undertake a more intensive and comprehensive research effort to overcome intelligence deficiencies with respect to: (a) probable operational capabilities of Soviet radar, and (b) probable costs of Soviet radar and other electronics. The SEC and EIC are to review these research efforts and submit a report on progress made to the IAC prior to 1 July 1956.

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IAC-D-57/8
23 August 1955


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-7-55: Soviet Gross
Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key
Overseas Installations Through Mid-1958

1. On 23 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in paragraph 7.

2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-57/8
23 August 1955

POST-MORTEM ON NIE 11-7-55: SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES
FOR ATTACK ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS
THROUGH MID-1958

25X1B 1. NIE 11-7-55 was approved by the IAC on 17 May 1955. Subsequent information [redacted] required several substantive changes and a considerable increase in over-all estimates of Soviet Long-Range Air Force capabilities. These changes were reviewed by the IAC representatives and approved without formal submission to the IAC on 23 June 1955. There were no agency dissents.

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I. FINDINGS

2. This estimate was essentially an updating of NIE 11-7A-54, completed in the last quarter of 1954. The principal new feature was an attempt to analyze in greater detail the operational problems of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force. NIE 11-7-55 indicates a substantial increase in the capabilities of this force over those estimated in 11-7A-54, due primarily to the appearance of a new long-range turbo-prop heavy bomber (BEAR) and an increase in estimated numbers of the jet heavy bomber (BISON).

3. Estimates of Soviet capabilities to attack the US still suffer from lack of adequate intelligence pertaining to Soviet aircraft production, training in the Soviet Long-Range Air Force, airfield development and capacities, and the technical capabilities of Soviet aircraft and equipment. These estimates likewise suffer from deficiencies in nuclear weapon and guided missile* capabilities intelligence.

[redacted]

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25X1B [redacted] In view of the deficiency in our knowledge on rates of production, it is entirely possible that the judgments as to future Soviet capabilities given in NIE 11-7-55 could be quite wide of the mark.

5. Although there is considerable evidence pertaining to Soviet Long-Range Air Force home bases, training programs, and deployment of forces, it is not adequate for an accurate assessment of capabilities.

* See Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field
(IAC-M-183, 8 February, Item 9.)
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IAC-D-57/8

23 August 1955


Information on the capacities of forward bases is particularly weak and is of primary importance for an assessment of present capability to launch any substantial air attack within a limited period of time. At the same time, there is a complete lack of evidence on development or use of in-flight refueling techniques for range extension. As the Soviet forces bring into use even more complex weapons systems, the quality of combat readiness of personnel and units becomes an increasingly important factor. There also appears to be a need for a more complete analysis of LRAF training programs, to provide indices of Soviet operational doctrine and readiness.

6. No attempt has been made thus far to estimate the economic cost of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force buildup. This will be of increasing importance in view of the choices the USSR will have to make in the future between aircraft and guided missiles. The recommendation made in connection with the post-mortem on NIE 11-3-55 to initiate research on the economic cost of the total Soviet military effort should meet this need.

II. ACTION

7. The IAC has approved the following actions:

- a. That an effort be made to produce more comprehensive studies on all Soviet operational problems in connection with attacks against the US and key overseas installations.



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- c. That continuing efforts be made to improve collection and analysis of intelligence on Soviet aircraft production, particularly on those aspects of the problem pertinent to estimating future Soviet AOB.

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IAC-D-57/7
16 August 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-3-55: Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960

1. On 16 August, the IAC noted the attached findings and approved the action set forth in paragraph 8.
2. The IAC agencies are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to comply.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Secretary /

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IAC-D-57/7

16 August 1955

POST-MORTEM ON NIE 11-3-55: SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF
ACTION THROUGH 1960

1. NIE 11-3-55, the annual estimate of trends in the development of Soviet power and policy, was approved by the IAC on 17 May 1955. Coordination proceeded relatively smoothly without major delays or serious disagreement, and the estimate was produced on schedule. The principal dissents occurred on questions of judgment -- the degree of independence enjoyed by Communist China in matters of major policy, the degree of likelihood that the USSR would withdraw from East Germany, and the likelihood of open intervention by the USSR in hostilities between the US and Communist China which threatened the existence of the latter.

2. As in the past, most of the difficulties encountered in the preparation and coordination of NIE 11-3-55 were the result of long-standing deficiencies of data on the Soviet area, deficiencies which, barring a break-through in collection and analytical techniques, are unlikely to be corrected at an early date. This post-mortem does not attempt to catalogue these standard gaps again.^{1/} Instead, it explores some of the basic problems of analysis that were encountered in the preparation of the estimate.

I. FINDINGS

3. General. The general limitations of intelligence on the USSR were clearly evident in the process of attempting to measure the forces shaping Soviet policy. Intelligence was able to illuminate the broad outlines of the chief problems confronting the Soviet leadership, but it was unable to reveal the degree to which these problems, either separately or collectively, generated pressures on Soviet policy. How, for example, would the continuation of group rule affect Soviet decision-making? How heavy were the various claims on Soviet

^{1/} Such a list is contained in IAC-D-57/2, Post-Mortem on NIE Production 1 January - 30 June 1954, which was noted by the IAC on 16 November 1954.

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economic resources? How seriously did the Kremlin regard German rearmament? The absence of satisfactory answers to these and similar questions seriously limited our ability to estimate the course which Soviet policy was likely to pursue in the future.

4. Political Intelligence. One of the principal difficulties encountered during the coordination of NIE 11-3-55 was in obtaining agreement on the key issues which confront the Soviet leadership and which promote unity or dissension within its ranks. In particular, there was disagreement about the evidence regarding the policy issues behind the February 1955 shift in the Soviet leadership. This disagreement arose in large measure because of uncertainty as to the nature and degree of actual high-level controversy within the USSR. As a matter of fact, we cannot expect to get very firm evidence on such matters, and our judgment has to depend in large part on the assumption that deviations and contradictions in Soviet communications media provide clues to the underlying realities of Soviet political behavior.

5. Economic Intelligence. Despite some progress made in economic intelligence on the USSR, most notably in estimates of economic growth, substantial problems still remain. The basic problem in this field is to determine the extent to which the Soviet economy is capable of meeting the competing claims for resources arising from the various internal and external commitments of Soviet policy. In an effort to find some solution to this problem, attention was focused in the discussion of NIE 11-3-55 on a particularly difficult aspect of intelligence on Soviet resources allocation, the estimated economic cost of the over-all Soviet military effort.

6. It now appears, in light of the findings of the later and more intensive research effort on air defense costs in NIE 11-5-55, that the procedures adopted in NIE 11-3-55 for estimating total future Soviet defense expenditures can be improved.

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7. Military Intelligence. Although the intelligence community has succeeded in collecting much information on the separate branches of the Soviet armed forces, it has thus far failed to include in the NIE's agreed views on broad Soviet strategy which are essential to estimating general trends in the Soviet military establishment. The requirement for such an estimate is particularly urgent at the present time because of recent indications that Soviet military thinking is adjusting to the impact of modern military technology. An agreed view as to probable Soviet strategic concepts would contribute greatly to long-range estimates of probable Soviet choices in weapons systems or in strengths of particular military components. An effort was made to include such an estimate in NIE 11-3-55, but it did not succeed.

II. ACTION

8. In addition to regular action taken to meet outstanding requirements, the IAC intelligence organizations shall:

- a. Initiate as soon as possible a study of the over-all costs of the Soviet military effort and its implications for future trends in the Soviet economy (see Paras. 5, 6 above) in an effort to obtain a coordinated appraisal in time to be contributed to the 1956 estimate on the USSR.
- b. Anticipate the need to include in their contributions to the 1956 paper a statement of their views on Soviet strategic concepts and their implications for future development of Soviet forces (see Para. 7 above).

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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortems on NIE 63.1-55, "Probable Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956"; NIE 63.2-55, "Probable Developments in Cambodia Through July 1956"; and NIE 63.3-55, "Probable Developments in Laos Through July 1956"

1. On 16 August, the IAC noted the principal intelligence gaps in the coverage of each area as follows:

- a. North Vietnam. With the exception of a few reports concerning the attitudes of the people in Hanoi, there were almost no reports concerning the reaction of the bulk of the population to Communist control.
- b. Cambodia. There exists practically no information concerning Communist activities, strength, or capabilities in Cambodia. While Communist strength in Cambodia is not believed to be significant at the present time, this is nevertheless an important deficiency.
- c. Laos. There is an almost complete lack of intelligence of any kind on the extent, nature, and capabilities of the Pathet Lao outside the two provinces that they occupy, and, except for order of battle, little information concerning the Pathet Lao within their two provinces.

2. Intelligence organizations of the IAC are requested to take appropriate remedial action.

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3 May 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period

1 July to 31 December 1954

1. There is attached a review of intelligence deficiencies noted in NIE production for the period 1 July to 31 December 1954. This has been prepared in compliance with the IAC action of 11 May 1954 (IAC-M-151) directing that such a paper be produced semi-annually for IAC noting and circulation by the DCI.
2. The IAC noted these findings on 26 April 1955 (IAC-M-194).
3. These have been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Recipients are requested to take appropriate action when reviewing research and collection programs.

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Secretary

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period
1 July to 31 December 1954

This review of intelligence deficiencies has been based on the production of the last six months of 1954 and is limited to those estimates in which specific gaps were revealed. The remaining estimates are listed separately at the end of the paper. The deficiencies noted in this study identify areas in which intelligence information is inadequate due either to gaps in collection or in research and analysis. No attempt is made to deal with the validity of substantive judgments made in the estimates. Papers are reviewed in the regular sequence of the numbered series in which they fall and no order of priority is implied. Gaps noted at the time of production which have since been closed have been omitted.

GENERAL

There continue to be significant deficiencies in our intelligence information, notably on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The gaps in this area are largely due to the great difficulties of collection in the face of the stringent security policies of the Communist countries. More effective exploitation of available information is also desirable. In most non-Communist areas, with the exception of Southeast Asia, the problem is more one of research and analysis than collection since great quantities of data are available.

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
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10 Series: SOVIET BLOC

NIE 10-7-54: "Communist Courses of Action in Asia through 1957"
(23 November 1954)

The following specific deficiencies were encountered in the production of this estimate:



3. Burma

a. Communist activities in Burma's border areas.

b. The extent and nature of Chinese Communist support of Communist activities in Burma.

4. General

The division of Sino-Soviet responsibilities in and direction of Asian Communist movements.



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NIE 11-4-54: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action through Mid-1959" (14 September 1954) [redacted]

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The deficiencies in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc (excluding Communist China) that were noted in the previous review of intelligence gaps were encountered in the preparation of this estimate. (See IAC-D-57/2, "Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the First Six Months of 1954," 16 November 1954, pages 2 and 3).

NIE 11-6-54: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field" (5 October 1954) [redacted]

25X1

A special post-mortem study of this paper has been undertaken and issued as IAC-D-57/3, 8 February 1955.

SNIE 11-7-54: "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations through 1 July 1957" (17 August 1954) [redacted]

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SNIE 11-7A-54: "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations through 1 July 1957" (14 September 1954) [redacted]

25X1

The major gaps encountered were inadequate information on the operational effectiveness of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force, especially training, refueling, status of facilities, and capacities of bases; specific allocations by the USSR of available nuclear materials to types of weapons in the small, medium and large yield categories; specific allocations of nuclear weapons and warheads to various delivery systems; actual disposition, including storage, of nuclear weapons and warheads; guided missile program and capabilities; and the specific performance characteristics of aircraft.

SNIE 11-8-54: "Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the US through Mid-1957" (14 September 1954) [redacted]

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This estimate revealed a deficiency in available intelligence on the scale of development and state of readiness of Soviet forward air bases [redacted]

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NIE 12-54: "Probable Developments in the European Satellites
through Mid-1956" (24 August 1954)

25X1

There continue to be wide margins of probable error in estimating certain areas of industrial production in the Satellites. For the area of military production in Poland and Czechoslovakia, deficiencies were especially noted in information on aircraft and tanks. Furthermore, there is a lack of information on the state of integration -- economic, scientific, military, and political -- of the Eastern European Satellite area with the USSR; the relations of the Satellite governments with each other and with the Soviet government, the relationship between the Eastern European Satellites and the Communist states in the Far East, and the influence of public attitudes upon Satellite policies.



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40 Series: FAR EAST



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50 Series: SOUTH ASIA

NIE 53-54: "The Outlook for Afghanistan" (19 October 1954)



Increasing Soviet interest and activity in Afghanistan have emphasized the inadequacy of:

a. Reliable economic data for determining the extent to which Afghanistan has become or may become economically dependent on the USSR. We have little data on the levels of Afghan-Soviet trade, other than Afghan-Soviet trade agreements, which may have been only partially fulfilled and may involve deceptive pricing.

b. Specific information on the extent of Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, particularly in the technical aid field, i. e., the number and location of Soviet technicians in the country, the extent of their subversive activities, and their success in this regard.

60 Series: SOUTHEAST ASIA



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[REDACTED]

NIE 63-5-54: "Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina" (3 August 1954)

25X6

[REDACTED]

This paper was prepared on a crash basis without benefit of formal contributions. There were many gaps in intelligence concerning the situation in Indochina, [REDACTED] Viet Minh capabilities, and Vietnamese attitudes.

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NIE 63-6-54: "Current Trends in South Vietnam" (15 September 1954)

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NIE 63-7-54: "Probable Developments in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia through July 1956" (23 November 1954)

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[REDACTED]

Information was inadequate on actual conditions in the provinces in South Vietnam, particularly the extent of Viet Minh and Government influence and control, and on relations between the sects and the French, and between Bao Dai and the sects. A similar lack of information on political conditions and Viet Minh influence existed with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

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[REDACTED]
(For a detailed consideration of Viet Minh violations of the armistice terms see IAC-D-93/2, 31 January 1955.)

25X1

70 Series: AFRICA

NIE 71-54: "Probable Developments in North Africa" (31 August 1954)

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Additional intelligence is required

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on such questions as Nationalist and Communist strength, relations, and capabilities.

100 Series: MISCELLANEOUS

SNIE 100-4-54: "The Situation with Respect to Certain Islands Off the Coast of Mainland China" (4 September 1954) [redacted]

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SNIE 100-4/1-54: "The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands Off the Coast of Mainland China" (10 September 1954) [redacted]

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In the preparation of these estimates there was revealed a lack of detailed information on Nationalist total ground Order of Battle, Order of Battle on the Offshore Islands, and specific defense preparations on these islands. Only very general information was available on Communist air, ground, and naval capabilities in the East China area.

SNIE 100-6-54: "World Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action Against Communist China" (28 November 1954)

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[redacted]

This estimate revealed the need for more information and research on the question of the relative importance of imports into China by land and sea.

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Other Estimates

The following estimates, also produced in this period, have not been included in the above review since they either did not reveal notable gaps in information or called for broad intelligence judgments not involving deficiencies in collection or research.

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NIE 25-54

"Probable Developments in Austria"
(21 September 1954)

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NIE 34-54

"Probable Developments in Iran
through 1955" (7 December 1954)

25X1

NIE 43-54

"Probable Developments in Taiwan
through Mid-1956" (14 September 1954)

25X1

NIE 80-54

"The Caribbean Republics"
(24 August 1954)

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE


Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-54:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field

1. Attached are the findings on intelligence deficiencies noted in the production of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," dated 5 October 1954.

2. The IAC noted these findings on 8 February 1955 (IAC-M-183, item 9).

3. These have been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Recipients are requested to take appropriate action when reviewing research and collection programs.


Secretary

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Post-Mortem on NIE 11-6-54:

Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field

FINDINGS

1. The preparation of NIE 11-6-54, during the course of which an intensive effort was made to exploit every possible source of evidence, revealed serious gaps in our intelligence in this important field. In view of our conclusion that the US and its allies face a growing Soviet guided missile threat, including eventually an entirely new type of threat from intercontinental ballistic missiles, the lack of up-to-date intelligence is of critical significance to the intelligence community.

KEY INTELLIGENCE GAPS

2. Major Scientific and Technical Gaps. Although we have available conclusive evidence of the great postwar Soviet interest in guided missiles and numerous indications that the USSR has a large and active research and development program, we have no firm intelligence on what particular missiles the USSR may presently be developing or may now have in operational use. Almost all of our intelligence on specific missile development work concerns projects in the USSR and even then is at least a few years old. We also need more up-to-date intelligence on Soviet research and development facilities and personalities connected with missile activities to permit us to determine more accurately the extent of the Soviet program.

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3. Major Economic Gaps. In this field the major gap is our lack of any specific intelligence as to Soviet missile production. We have no evidence beyond the reported Soviet production of a few hundred V-1's and V-2's in 1947-1949. Our economic analysis also revealed the need for better data on Soviet prices and costs, and on Soviet production and consumption patterns in the key fields of electronics and precision mechanisms, and special fuels, where important bottlenecks are believed to exist.

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INADEQUACY OF PRESENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

4. The basic reason for our lack of intelligence on the Soviet guided missile program is the inadequate collection effort presently being devoted to this field. Although the intelligence community has increased its effort [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] there are still only a very limited number of intelligence assets devoted specifically to the collection and analysis of information regarding guided missiles. There continues to be an urgent requirement for increased intelligence collection relating specifically to types and numbers of guided missiles being developed, tested, and/or produced.

5. Guided missile intelligence has received an insufficiently high priority effort in the past. The IAC has recognized this problem by placing GM intelligence in the highest priority category of National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4).

6. There also continues to be a need for effective coordination of effort in all aspects of GM intelligence.

AREAS FOR GREATER INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION

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SUGGESTED METHODS OF EXPLOITATION

9. A major effort to exploit all possible intelligence methods is desirable.

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d. Study of the possibilities of pilots' reconnaissance and the problems related thereto.

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16 November 1954

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Post-Mortem of NIE Production

for First Six Months of 1954

1. Attached are the consolidated findings on intelligence deficiencies noted in NIE production for the period 1 January - 30 June 1954. Tab A lists the estimates produced in the six-month period on which the findings are based.
2. This review of intelligence deficiencies was prepared in compliance with the IAC action of 11 May 1954 (IAC-M-151) directing that such a paper be produced semi-annually for IAC noting and circulation by the DCI.
3. The IAC noted these findings on 16 November (IAC-M-174, para. 3 a).
4. These have been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Recipients are requested to take appropriate action when reviewing research and collection programs.
5. Please note that the IAC representatives recommended that post-mortem findings should be passed by IAC members to their respective collection units with a request that these units report back action taken and results obtained. It was agreed that the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) should be included among those requested to act.


Secretary

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The classification of TAB A to
the Attachment is SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 November 1954

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period 1 January
to 30 June 1954

The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during the first six months of 1954. These deficiencies identify areas in which intelligence information is inadequate due either to gaps in collection or in research and analysis. No attempt is made to deal with the validity of substantive judgments made in the estimates. No order of priority is implied in the listing of gaps within sections. The estimates upon which these consolidated findings are based are listed in Tab A.

1. General

Since the intelligence deficiencies noted in this report reflect only the estimates undertaken during the six month period being reviewed, the list is by no means complete. In spite of the substantial intelligence information available, there continue to be numerous areas in which significant data are lacking. In general, it will be noted that the most important intelligence deficiency in the Soviet Bloc is one of collection, a fact which emphasizes the necessity for greater collection efforts in this area. Meanwhile, there is a need for full exploitation of available information. In most other areas, the over-all coverage is good and vast quantities of data are available. The problem here is largely one of research and analysis rather than collection.

2. Soviet Bloc (excluding Communist China)

Gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc continue to be those inherent in the restrictive security policies of the Communist states. However, the methods open to US intelligence for exploiting the

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25X6 limited range of data available are capable of further development and improvement. In general, the most significant gaps continue to be those relative to economic trends and scientific and technological developments. There also are gaps in many aspects of Soviet military capabilities. Estimative work in the period under review indicated a need for

- a. Soviet Economy. Intelligence on the Soviet economy continues to be limited.

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- 25X1B
- b. Soviet Aircraft. There is urgent need for more, and more reliable, data on Soviet aeronautical research and development programs; actual aircraft production; aircraft characteristics, and the capabilities of new Soviet aircraft types, especially long-range bombers and all-weather interceptors.
- c. Soviet Airfield Development. An intensified effort is required to collect more information on the development of Soviet airfields, especially those capable of supporting long-range bombers for attacks on the US and its overseas installations.

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- d. Soviet Logistics. A greater collection effort is needed for information bearing on the Soviet logistic capability to support continuing ground, naval, and air operations in various theaters, with special emphasis on the long-range air force and the air defense system.
- e. Nuclear Weapons. There is a continuing and urgent need for more effective collection and a greater analytical effort on weapons of mass destruction (such as the atomic cannon).
- f. Application of Nuclear Energy. Very little evidence is available on Soviet efforts with respect to the power applications of atomic energy. This field has special significance in view of proposals currently being considered at the international level.
- g. Guided Missiles. There is a continuing and urgent need for more effective collection and a greater analytical effort on all aspects of the Soviet guided missile program. (For details see the post-mortem, now in preparation, on NIE 11-6-54, 5 October 1954.)
- h. BW, RW, CW. No reliable information is available which indicates the status of Soviet developments in the fields of biological, radiological, and chemical warfare, nor on Soviet intentions relating thereto.
- i. Submarines. Although information on the numbers of Soviet submarines is very good, there is insufficient information on the technical characteristics of new submarines, particularly propulsion, weapons for use with submarines (torpedoes, mines, missiles), and tactics.

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3. Far East

The most critical uncertainties in this area recurred in one form or another in the preparation of many of the estimates produced during this period. Certain of the gaps listed probably can never be closed, others could be

- 25X6
- a. Sino-Soviet Relations. More reliable information is necessary on these questions: What is Peiping's role in the formulation and execution of major Communist policies in Asia? What division of responsibilities exists with respect to North Korea, Indochina, and the Asian Communist Parties? Are there any major differences over desired strategy or timing? For example, which partner was chiefly responsible for the Communist decision for an armistice in Korea? In Indochina? For what reasons? What is the extent and nature of Soviet economic and military assistance, particularly overland, to Communist China? What is the extent and nature of Soviet influence or control in the Chinese Communist Party and Government?
- b. Chinese Communist Domestic Developments. The work done by the IAC agencies in preparing NIE 13-54 "Communist China's Power Potential through 1957," resulted in better coverage than hitherto of developments within Communist China. However, the preparation of this and other estimates during this period revealed that our intelligence coverage on Communist China is still very inadequate on a number of questions, as is to a lesser extent our analysis of available data. We have to rely too largely on Chinese Communist public statements for our estimates of economic developments in mainland China. Our information is not adequate enough, nor is there an area of common agreement on methodology sufficiently large, to permit an agreed estimate on the capacity of the mainland transportation system. In

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agriculture we lack reliable information on production, the rate of collectivization, and peasant reactions to the regime's agricultural policy. We know that some kind of disciplining of party and government personnel at the highest level has been occurring, but we have no firm or detailed evidence concerning policy or personality differences within Communist China's top leadership. Lastly, the preparation of NIE 13-54 has revealed that more reliable intelligence is needed on the question of public attitudes in China toward the regime.

- c. Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. We need more objective intelligence on Viet Minh capabilities and intentions.

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This was particularly the case with respect to intelligence on Viet Minh military capabilities.

- d. Other Deficiencies:

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
(2) Laos and Cambodia. The quality and stability of the military and national leadership.

(3) Indonesian politics. Our ability to estimate future trends and developments in Indonesia has been limited by insufficient coverage of inter and intra-party activities, particularly at local levels.

(4) Communist relationships in the Philippines. Relationships among the Huks, the CCP, and the PCP are not clear.

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
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4. Western Europe

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The major intelligence problems with regard to Western Europe primarily involve the evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of vast quantities of data, rather than collection deficiencies.



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5. Middle East-South Asia

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6. Latin America

Over-all intelligence coverage of the Latin American area is good, although deficiencies still exist in the following fields:

- a. The political positions of important military figures, trends in the political views of both senior and junior military officers, and the

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16 November 1954

degree of dissatisfaction within the officer corps in regard to their governments. In Bolivia, the strength, capabilities, and loyalty of the civilian militia.

- b. The political orientation, the economic status, the personalities, and factionalism of labor movements.
- c. Trends in Communist Party strengths and capabilities; in Communist infiltration of government, labor, and intellectual circles; and in the inter-territorial coordination and communications procedures between Communist movements.

7. Miscellaneous Estimates

The NIE's produced during the period in the 100 (Miscellaneous) series were rather specialized estimates dealing primarily with questions involving speculation and judgment on which little "evidence" was available. However, NIE 100-3-54 "Consequences of a Relaxation of non-Communist Controls on Trade with the Soviet Bloc" indicated, as have other East-West trade estimates, the need for better evidence with respect to Soviet scientific and technological developments in order to more adequately determine the "qualitative" (as opposed to the quantitative) importance of imports from the West to Soviet military strength.

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Tab A to
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16 November 1954

National Intelligence Estimates Published

From 1 January 1954 to 30 June 1954*

00 Series: GENERAL

None

10 Series: SOVIET BLOC

NIE 10-54	Soviet Bloc Economic Warfare Capabilities and Courses of Action (9 March 1954)
NIE 10-2-54	Communist Courses of Action in Asia through Mid-1955 (15 March 1954)
NIE 10-3-54	Communist Capabilities in Indochina (1 June 1954)
SNIE 10-4-54	Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina (15 June 1954)
SNIE 10-5-54	Soviet Bloc Reaction to Certain US Courses of Action to Restrict Bloc Representation in the US (29 June 1954)
SNIE 11-54	Likelihood of General War through 1957 (15 February 1954)
SNIE 11-2-54	Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through 1957 (24 February 1954)

*NOTE: Prior to 22 June dissemination date is shown. Subsequent estimates show the date on which IAC action was taken.

Tab A to
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16 November 1954

NIE 11-3A-54	Summary of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1957 (16 February 1954)
NIE 11-5-54	Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy through Mid-1959 (7 June 1954)
NIE 12.4-54	Probable Developments in East Germany through 1955 (22 January 1954)
NIE 13-54	Communist China's Power Potential through 1957 (3 June 1954)

20 Series: WESTERN EUROPE

NIE 20-54	The Outlook for Western Europe over the Next Decade (26 April 1954)
NIE 27.1-54	Probable Developments in Spain (17 May 1954)
NIE 28.5-54	Current Situation and Probable Developments in Finland during 1954 (8 January 1954)

30 Series: NEAR EAST

25X1

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40 Series: FAR EAST

None

50 Series: SOUTH ASIA

25X6

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60 Series: SOUTHEAST ASIA

NIE 63-54	Consequences within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu (30 April 1954)
SNIE 63-2-54	The Effects of Certain Possible Developments on the Military Security and Political Stability of Laos and Cambodia through 1954 (9 June 1954)
NIE 63-3-54	Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina (21 May 1954)
NIE 63-4-54	Probable Military and Political Developments in Indochina over the Next 30 Days (15 June - 15 July) (15 June 1954)
NIE 65-54	The Probable Outlook in Indonesia through 1954 (19 May 1954)
NIE 66-54	Probable Developments in the Philippine Republic (23 March 1954)

70 Series: AFRICA

None

80 Series: CARIBBEAN AREA



25X1

90 Series: SOUTH AMERICA

NIE 91-54	Probable Developments in Argentina (9 March 1954)
NIE 92-54	Probable Developments in Bolivia (19 March 1954)

- 3 -

Tab A to
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Tab A to
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100 Series: MISCELLANEOUS

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SNIE 100-2-54

Probable Reactions of Communist China,
the USSR, and the Free World to Certain
US Courses of Action in Korea (9 March 1954)

NIE 100-3-54

Consequences of a Relaxation of Non-
Communist Controls on Trade with the
Soviet Bloc (23 March 1954)

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Tab A to
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S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-57/1

1 May 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEPROGRESS REPORTS ON ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Attached for your information are two reports (TABs A and B) which attempt to bring up to date the status of subject actions, previously reported on 21 October 1952 (IAC-D-57).

*to be
issued
later*

2. The previous reports resulted exclusively from action taken following a post-mortem on SE-27. Those now transmitted also bear directly on that estimate. In the interim, however, the Office of National Estimates, in cooperation with the other agencies, has issued a memorandum summarizing the results of three post-mortems: on NIE-47, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia;" on NIE-55/1, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea;" and on NIE-58, "Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses" (Memorandum to AD/IC, dated 28 January 1953, TAB C).

3. As has been recognized by the IAC representatives, the actions taken initially in response to SE-27 are equally significant in connection with these three later post-mortems. Moreover, many of the gaps referenced in the paper of January 28 (particularly 1(a), 2(a), 2(d), 3, 4, 5, C-1(a)) are covered by the collection priorities earlier assigned by the IPC in pursuance of DCID 4/2. (It should be borne in mind that whereas gaps in most cases raise research problems, the IPC effort is directed not at research but exclusively at obtaining raw information.) The rest of the gaps mentioned are not now covered by targets accepted under IPC priorities, though in some instances there will be useful reports

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4. The administrators of the collection systems of the Foreign Service, the Service Attaches, and CIA have stated that adequate requirements and priorities for obtaining additional information on these matters have been served. These requirements and priorities, as well as collection responsibilities, are constantly re-examined and revised to reflect essential gaps in information.

Secretary

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1 May 1953

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

28 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem on NIE-47, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia," NIE-55/1, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea," and NIE-58, "Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses."

REFERENCE: Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies in NIE's, dated 3 June 1952

ENCLOSURE: A. List of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in the Preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58

1. On 16 December 1952, the IAC representatives held a post-mortem meeting on NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58.

2. The IAC representatives noted that:

a. Steps taken by the IAC agencies as a result of the post-mortem on SE-27 ("Probable Effects of Various Possible Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China," dated 5 June 1952) are beginning to result in better coverage of economic questions.

b. Many of the deficiencies encountered in the preparation of NIE-47, NIE-55/1, and NIE-58 are obvious weaknesses which the IAC agencies are currently trying to correct. In other cases the gaps may well be "unknowable."

c. Nevertheless, a further study of the intelligence weaknesses in these estimates may assist the efforts made by collection and research activities coping with these and related problems.

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1 May 1953

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1 May 1953

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*b. Chinese Communist military production. Of POL?
Of munitions? Of transport equipment?

**c. The effect to date of the Korean war. On the
viability of the Chinese Communist economy? On the rehabi-
litation and expansion of productive capacity? On the economic
dependence upon the USSR, and on the terms under which Communist
China receives military and economic aid from the USSR?

**1. What is the amphibious capability of the Soviet Far
East forces?

*3. What is the role of the Soviet Air Force in the Korean
war and the CCAF? What combat experience have CCAF pilots actually
had? What degree of combat proficiency have CCAF pilots demonstrated
in Korea?

**4. What staff responsibility relationships exist in the joint
Sino-Soviet military direction of the Korean war?

**5. What trends exist in Communist China's armed force mobili-
zation programs? Are the armed forces growing larger, smaller,
or remaining static in their numerical strength?

B. Popular Attitudes within Communist China

**1. What attitudes exist within the CCP, the Army, and the
general population regarding:

a. Support of the regime?

b. The USSR? US? Japan? Chinese Nationalists?

**2. How important are such attitudes? To what extent must
the regime consider them in determining and implementing policy?

** Some intelligence is available on these questions, but the
receipt of more reliable information and an augmentation of
analytical effort would enable the IAC to make better estimates
than is now possible.

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1 May 1953

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C. The Nature of Sino-Soviet Political Relations

*1. The influence which the USSR exerts in the key centers of the Chinese Communist regime.

a. In the regime's security agencies? Army? Party? Government? Economy?

b. What key personalities in the regime, if any, may be said to be "Moscow men"?

**2. The influence (political, economic and military) which the USSR exerts in the border areas of Communist China.

a. What is the nature of political relations among Communist China, the USSR, and Outer Mongolia?

b. What influence does the USSR (or Outer Mongolia) exert in Manchuria? in Inner Mongolia? in Sinkiang?

**3. The relationships which exist between Communist China and the USSR concerning primary influence in:

a. The Communist doctrine of revolution in Asia?

b. The strategic direction of Communist activities in Southeast Asia? in Japan? in North Korea?

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ENCLOSURE "A"

LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THE PREPARATION
OF NIE's 47, 55/1 AND 58
(in order of priority)

Several intelligence deficiencies were revealed in the preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58. These deficiencies are of varying degree and importance. For the most part, they are related to three general questions:

- a. Sino-Soviet support of the war effort in Korea;
- b. The nature of certain attitudes within Communist China;
- c. The nature of Sino-Soviet political relations.

Outlined below are specific points on which NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58 were weakened by the lack of adequate intelligence.

A. The Sino-Soviet War Effort in Korea

*1. What are Communist intentions with respect to an armistice in Korea? Is there any divergence of view, Chinese and Soviet, on this question?

2. What is the Sino-Soviet capability to support: (a) intensified hostilities in Korea, and (b) a general war in the Far East?

*a. Communist military stockpiles. Where are Soviet Far East stockpiles located, and what is their level? To what extent does Soviet support of the Korean war entail a drain upon Soviet Far East stockpiles? Upon Soviet Far East production? Upon shipments from Communist Europe? How large, and where, are Communist China's aviation POL stockpiles?

* There is little or no reliable intelligence at present on these questions.

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1 May 1953

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IAC-D-57/1

1 May 1953

3. The IAC representatives have agreed on a list of the more important current deficiencies in our intelligence (Enclosure A).

4. Recommendation

That the collection agencies of the intelligence community review their priorities in the light of the findings of the IAC representatives as set forth in Enclosure A.

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D/Asst. Director/Adm.
National Estimates

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Return to AO/NE
S-E-C-R-E-T

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21 October 1952

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN SE-27

1. Attached for your information are two progress reports on the above subject requested in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence dated 13 August 1952 to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

2. Additional reports will be issued from time to time as appropriate indicating the status of actions to improve intelligence coverage of Communist China.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

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21 October 1952

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22 October 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION


SUBJECT: Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27

REFERENCE: Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 13 August 1952.

(This memorandum covers economic
research and collection requirements)

Since receipt of the referenced memorandum, a series of actions have been initiated through the Economic Intelligence Committee which I believe will, in time, effectively correct the intelligence deficiencies in research and collection requirements. I have outlined these actions below, with specific reference to the responsible agency.

1. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS:



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- c. Representatives of the military services on the Requirements Subcommittee have considered the desirability of submitting their standing collection requirements to that Subcommittee for review and comment sometime before the end of the year. All IAC agencies have generally agreed to do this with the exception of the Air Force which still has the matter under consideration.
- d. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports will prepare comprehensive requirements [] on the Chinese Communist economy and will submit these to the Requirements Subcommittee for review by the IAC agencies. This will be accomplished before the end of the year.
- e. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports, in line with its expanded research responsibilities, will review the priority intelligence targets for China which have been formulated by the Intelligence Priorities Committee of the IAC.

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2. RESEARCH:

- a. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports has, since the post-mortem to SE-27, increased the number of professional personnel actually working on Communist China from [] full-time analysts [] to []. When the present T/O is fully manned there will be [] analysts assigned to the China area [] (Tab A)
- b. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports has undertaken to inventory the readily available information on the Chinese Communist economy, and to complete a summary study for the major economic sections by 15 January 1953. The stepped-up ORR program is being coordinated with the NIS program and with the programs of other IAC agencies by means of a survey through the EIC of the potential of the respective IAC agencies for dealing with specific research gaps. The EIC has constituted an Interagency Coordinating Group to direct this survey and advise on the development of an over-all research program. (Tab B)
- c. Pending the outcome of this survey, the CIA/ Office of Research and Reports has initiated a greatly expanded research effort on this area. A total of 22 research projects directly focused on Communist China have been programmed for the calendar year 1953, as compared to about 5 in 1952. In addition, some 55 projects covering the entire Soviet Bloc will also include sections on this area. (Tab C)

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4. GENERAL:

Filling the gaps on Chinese economic development and capability which are most critical for national intelligence hinges on linking an intensified effort on China with the already considerable effort on the USSR. The problem is long-term, and the research program being developed to meet it must also be long-term. Many of the final answers to the general deficiencies noted in the post-mortem on SE-27 will not be immediately forthcoming, but it is believed confidently that the coming year will bring a marked improvement in economic intelligence support to national estimates on China.

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ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Chairman
Economic Intelligence Committee

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S-E-C-R-E-T

EIC-D-7
CIA 438984

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20 October 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: All EIC Members

FROM : Chairman, Economic Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT : EIC Coordination of Intelligence Research on the ChiCom Economy

1. As a part of the general program of the EIC to strengthen the economic intelligence effort on Communist China it is essential that steps be taken to coordinate the research activities of all the IAC and other agencies to ensure that (a) research be appropriately distributed among the various relevant sectors of the ChiCom economy with conscious reference to their relative priorities, (b) that duplication of effort be reduced to a minimum, and (c) that the IAC members be delegated responsibility for specific aspects of the economy in accordance with their unique capabilities.

2. To secure this coordination of research effort, an ad hoc EIC Coordinating Group is appointed, composed of a representative from each IAC agency who is well-informed on the nature and status of research on the ChiCom economy in his agency. [redacted] of ORR/CIA, is designated as Chairman, and [redacted] of ORR/CIA is designated Secretary.

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3. To implement the coordination program, the Coordinating Group initially will institute a survey of the potential of the IAC agencies for dealing with specific sectors of the ChiCom economy. The survey, similar to but far more detailed than that conducted by [redacted] on the "Adequacy of Intelligence Research Relating to the ChiCom Economy" (19 May 1952), should be organized in accordance with an outline in which the entire economy is divided into a number of major sectors. (Such an outline is attached for consideration by the Committee upon its activation.)

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4. The survey should involve a written contribution by each IAC member indicating as follows:

a. Personnel statement: names, backgrounds (general economist, engineer, historian, etc.), assignments and approximate amount of time devoted to research on China.

b. Nature of the research on the ChiCom economy conducted by the agency on a continuing basis and the scope of materials and files it maintains.

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22 September 1952

Provisional Outline for
Inventory of Research on
The Economy of Communist China

- . Economic Organization and Administration
 - A. Economic Planning
 - 1. Present plans
 - 2. Preparation of the plans
 - 3. Control of plan fulfillment
 - B. Administrative Control of Industry
 - C. Present Effectiveness of Control and Prospects for the Immediate Future
- . Economic Aggregates
 - A. Gross National Product Distributed by Type of Industry
 - B. Size and Breakdown of the National Government Budget
 - C. Financial Statistics
 - 1. Price indices and the level of price
- . Financial and Fiscal System
 - A. Brief Description of Nature and Function
- . Trade
 - A. External Trade
 - 1. Imports
 - 2. Exports
 - B. Internal Trade

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4. Human Resources

A. Size and Geographical Distribution of the Population

B. Occupied Population

1. Geographical Distribution

2. Occupational Distribution

3. Industrial Distribution

C. Scientific, Technical and Other Specialized Training

5. Agriculture (including agricultural processing)

A. Brief Description of the Nature and Uses of the Principal Products

B. Amounts Produced

C. Principal Locations of the Production

D. Amounts Consumed Internally; Amounts Exported

6. Economic Services

A. Transportation

1. Brief description of existing facilities

2. Capacity of existing facilities

3. Construction of additional facilities

B. Communications

1. Brief description of existing facilities

2. Construction of additional facilities

C. Electric Power

1. Brief description of existing facilities

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c. List of projects completed during the past year, in progress, and planned.

5. The Group need hold only one or two meetings at which the survey can be explained and formally initiated. The survey should then be continued as a series of bilateral discussions conducted by the Chairman or Secretary, during which one of them would undertake to meet each key Far East economic specialist in each agency. The personal contact would facilitate appraisal of each agency's potential and would be an important supplement to the written statements.

6. Upon completion of the survey (not later than 14 November 1952), the Group should again meet to discuss remedies for gaps and deficiencies developed and to recommend an allocation of research responsibilities.

/s/

ROBERT AMORY, JR.

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C. Electric Power (Continued)

2. Capacity of existing facilities
3. Construction of additional facilities

. Mineral Mining, Extraction, and Processing

- A. Size and Location of Mineral Reserves; Extent and Adequacy of Surveys
- B. Types and Amounts of Principal Products
- C. Locations of Principal Mines and Processing Plants
- D. Amounts Imported; Amounts Exported

, Manufacturing

- A. Consumers Goods
- B. Chemicals
- C. Engineering Industries (including military end-items)

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TAB C

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SUBJECTS COVERED BY ORR PROJECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

I. Projects in Process or Completed, 1952

A. Completed, 1952

Petroleum (Part A)
Shipbuilding

B. In Progress, 1952

Petroleum (Part B)
Economic Organization
Armament, Input Requirements

II. Projects Planned for the Calendar Year 1953

A. Projects Devoted Entirely to Communist China

Aircraft including Engines
Ammunition, Input Requirements
Engineering Industries
Electric Systems, Manchuria
Electric Power, Communist China
Industrial Labor Force
Railroad Construction
Transportation - Organization, Traffic and Statistics (3)
Foreign Trade (2)
Balance of Payments
Organization of Selected Industries (2)
Economic Organization, North Korea
Economic Estimates Handbook
Economic Development (2)
Agriculture (2)
Ferrous Metals

B. Projects Dealing in Part with Communist China
(As a rough approximation, 10 percent of this research effort will be devoted to Communist China.)

Carbon and Graphite Electrodes
Railroad Equipment, Inputs

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Oil Refining and Chemical Processing Equipment
Metallurgical Equipment
Automotive Equipment
Storage and Primary Batteries
Radar and Electronic Equipment (5)
Communications Equipment (2)
Electrical Machinery and Equipment (6)
Gas Turbines
Machine Tools (2)
Textile Equipment
Forges and Presses (2)
Aircraft Production Machinery
Armament, Production and Trade (3)
Combat and Field Maintenance Equipment (2)
Agriculture and Forestry (8)
Ferrous Metals and Ferro-alloys (7)
Non-ferrous Metals
Rayon Tire Cord
Carbon Black
Bead Wire
Thermosetting Type Plates
Synthetic Plastics
Metallurgical Coke
Manufactured Gas
Coke Chemicals
Gasification of Coal

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate number of projects planned relating to these subjects.

21 October 1952

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S-E-C-R-E-T

8 October 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION


SUBJECT: Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27

(This memorandum deals only with
coverage of
Chinese language publications)

This Office was requested in paragraph 4 of a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence dated 13 August 1952 on the above subject to review and report on the needs for coordinating, translating, indexing, and distributing the foreign language material already available on Communist China. These questions have been surveyed with the Offices concerned. The following actions are being taken by agreement of the action Offices indicated to meet the present deficiencies in these areas.

1. PROCUREMENT OF PUBLISHED MATERIALS:

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8 October 1952

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2. INDEXING:

a. Unclassified Chinese Language Publications:

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- (2) Periodicals- The State Department/ Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution Division will secure details of the plan of the American Council of Learned Societies, under Ford Foundation Grant, for providing a periodic survey of current Chinese publications to determine whether it contemplates periodic listings of translated titles together with subject indexing.



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3. TRANSLATION OF CHINESE LANGUAGE MATERIALS:



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
8 October 1952

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4. EXPLOITATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES OF CHINESE PRESS AND PERIODICALS:

- a. The CIA Office of Collection and Dissemination and CIA/00 Foreign Documents Division, in cooperation with the IAC agencies, will develop a plan by which all requirements of the IAC agencies for exploitation of economic information on China from such sources will be channelled through CIA/Office of Collection and Dissemination including provisions for:

- (1) Quarterly revision of requirements lists;
- (2) Serving of ad hoc requirements with specifications of time of coverage, specific data required, and date needed.



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JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

Office of the Director

August 13, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27

1. The Office of National Estimates has reviewed with the IAC representatives the intelligence deficiencies in SE-27. These have been presented in a paper issued by the Office of National Estimates on 25 July 1952 entitled, "Statement of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27."

2. Inasmuch as the intelligence deficiencies are primarily in regard to economic matters, I have requested Mr. Amory, as the Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), to take up with that Committee as an urgent matter:

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a. The review of existing guidance in this field to collection agencies;

b. Action required to fill the specific gaps as pointed out on page four of the enclosure relating to seaborne exports from the Communist bloc to Communist China and railroad transportation;

c. Consideration of what additional research facilities within the community should be provided in order to strengthen our research in this field.

3. I am requesting Mr. Amory to make available to me and to the other IAC members a progress report within six weeks.

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4. The statement of intelligence deficiencies points out needs for coordinating, translating, indexing, and distributing the material already available on Communist China. I have requested Mr. Reber, the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination to look into this question with the IAC agencies and similarly to submit a report to me and the IAC within six weeks. In connection with this Mr. Reber will keep in close touch with Mr. Amory and will seek the advice of the EIC Subcommittee on Requirements.

/s/ Walter B. Smith

WALTER B. SMITH
Director

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SMITH

Noted by C/ISI

10/30/52

Noted by DGI

10/30/52

Noted by DGI

10/30/52

Your memorandum of 13 August 1952 informed IAC members that in order to correct INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN SPECIAL ESTIMATE 27, "Probable Effects of Various Possible Courses of Action with respect to Communist China," you were requesting:

Mr. Amory, Chairman, Economic Intelligence Committee, to take up with EIC the deficiencies in regard to economic matters;
Mr. Reber to look into the question of coordination and distribution of material already available on Communist China; and
Mr. Amory and Mr. Reber to submit progress reports to IAC within six weeks.

Attached are two Progress Reports as follow:

Mr. Amory's Progress Report (Tabbed) listing a series of actions which have been initiated through EIC which should, in time, effectively correct intelligence deficiencies in research and collection requirements. The list specifies the agency having action responsibility in each case. Filling gaps in intelligence on Chinese economic development and capability hinges on linking an intensified effort on China with the current effort on USSR. Although many of final answers to general intelligence deficiencies noted will not be immediately forthcoming, it is believed that the coming year will bring a marked improvement in economic intelligence support to national estimates on China.

Tab A is the T/O for O/RR China Research Analysts. Since July the number of such personnel has been increased [] and when present T/O is fully manned there will be [] analysts in O/RR assigned to China area.

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Tab B deals with steps being taken to coordinate research activities of all IAC and other agencies as part of the program to strengthen the economic intelligence effort on Communist China.

Tab C lists the research projects focused on Communist China which O/RR has programmed for 1953 — 22 projects as compared with about 5 in 1952. Also, the 55 projects covering Soviet Bloc will include sections on Communist China.

Mr. Reber's Progress Report (Tabbed) informing the IAC that Offices concerned have reviewed the question of coordinating, translating, indexing, and distributing available Chinese language material; and listing actions being taken by specified Offices to meet the deficiencies in these activities.

Additional reports will be issued from time to time to indicate the status of actions to improve intelligence coverage of Communist China.

It is recommended that the IAC note the attached progress reports.

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IAC-D-45/24 37
21 October 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN SE-27

1. Attached for your information are two progress reports on the above subject requested in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence dated 13 August 1952 to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

2. Additional reports will be issued from time to time as appropriate indicating the status of actions to improve intelligence coverage of Communist China.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

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IAC-D-45/24
21 October 1952

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22 October 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in SE-27

REFERENCE: Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 13 August 1952

(This memorandum covers economic
research and collection requirements)

Since receipt of the referenced memorandum, a series of actions have been initiated through the Economic Intelligence Committee which I believe will, in time, effectively correct the intelligence deficiencies in research and collection requirements. I have outlined these actions below, with specific reference to the responsible agency.

1. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS:



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- c. Representatives of the military services on the Requirements Subcommittee have considered the desirability of submitting their standing collection requirements to that Subcommittee for review and comment sometime before the end of the year. All IAC agencies have generally agreed to do this with the exception of the Air Force which still has the matter under consideration.
- d. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports will prepare comprehensive requirements [] on the Chinese Communist economy and will submit these to the Requirements Subcommittee for review by the IAC agencies. This will be accomplished before the end of the year.
- e. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports, in line with its expanded research responsibilities, will review the priority intelligence targets for China which have been formulated by the Intelligence Priorities Committee of the IAC.

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2. RESEARCH:

- a. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports has, since the post-mortem to SE-27, increased the number of professional personnel actually working on Communist China from []
[] When the present T/O is fully manned there will be [] analysts assigned to the China area []
(Tab A)
- b. The CIA/ Office of Research and Reports has undertaken to inventory the readily available information on the Chinese Communist economy, and to complete a summary study for the major economic sections by 15 January 1953. The stepped-up ORR program is being coordinated with the NIS program and with the programs of other IAC agencies by means of a survey through the EIC of the potential of the respective IAC agencies for dealing with specific research gaps. The EIC has constituted an Interagency Coordinating Group to direct this survey and advise on the development of an over-all research program.
(Tab B)
- c. Pending the outcome of this survey, the CIA/ Office of Research and Reports has initiated a greatly expanded research effort on this area. A total of 22 research projects directly focused on Communist China have been programmed for the calendar year 1953, as compared to about 5 in 1952. In addition, some 55 projects covering the entire Soviet Bloc will also include sections on this area. (Tab C)

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d.

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3. SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE GAPS:

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4. GENERAL:

Filling the gaps on Chinese economic development and capability which are most critical for national intelligence hinges on linking an intensified effort on China with the already considerable effort on the USSR. The problem is long-term, and the research program being developed to meet it must also be long-term. Many of the final answers to the general deficiencies noted in the post-mortem on SE-27 will not be immediately forthcoming, but it is believed confidently that the coming year will bring a marked improvement in economic intelligence support to national estimates on China.

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ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Chairman
Economic Intelligence Committee

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TAB B

EIC-D-7
CIA 438984

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20 October 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: All EIC Members

FROM : Chairman, Economic Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT : EIC Coordination of Intelligence Research on the ChiCom Economy

1. As a part of the general program of the EIC to strengthen the economic intelligence effort on Communist China it is essential that steps be taken to coordinate the research activities of all the IAC and other agencies to ensure that (a) research be appropriately distributed among the various relevant sectors of the ChiCom economy with conscious reference to their relative priorities, (b) that duplication of effort be reduced to a minimum, and (c) that the IAC members be delegated responsibility for specific aspects of the economy in accordance with their unique capabilities.

2. To secure this coordination of research effort, an ad hoc EIC Coordinating Group is appointed, composed of a representative from each IAC agency who is well-informed on the nature and status of research on the ChiCom economy in his agency. [redacted] of ORR/CIA, 25X1A is designated as Chairman, and [redacted] of ORR/CIA is designated 25X1A Secretary.

3. To implement the coordination program, the Coordinating Group initially will institute a survey of the potential of the IAC agencies for dealing with specific sectors of the ChiCom economy. The survey, similar to but far more detailed than that conducted by [redacted] on the "Adequacy of Intelligence Research Relating to the ChiCom Economy" (19 May 1952), should be organized in accordance with an outline in which the entire economy is divided into a number of major sectors. (Such an outline is attached for consideration by the Committee upon its activation.) 25X1A

4. The survey should involve a written contribution by each IAC member indicating as follows:

a. Personnel statement: names, backgrounds (general economist, engineer, historian, etc.), assignments and approximate amount of time devoted to research on China.

b. Nature of the research on the ChiCom economy conducted by the agency on a continuing basis and the scope of materials and files it maintains.

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c. List of projects completed during the past year, in progress, and planned.

5. The Group need hold only one or two meetings at which the survey can be explained and formally initiated. The survey should then be continued as a series of bilateral discussions conducted by the Chairman or Secretary, during which one of them would undertake to meet each key Far East economic specialist in each agency. The personal contact would facilitate appraisal of each agency's potential and would be an important supplement to the written statements.

6. Upon completion of the survey (not later than 14 November 1952), the Group should again meet to discuss remedies for gaps and deficiencies developed and to recommend an allocation of research responsibilities.

/s/

ROBERT AMORY, JR.

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22 September 1952

Provisional Outline for
Inventory of Research on
The Economy of Communist China

. Economic Organization and Administration

A. Economic Planning

1. Present plans
2. Preparation of the plans
3. Control of plan fulfillment

B. Administrative Control of Industry

C. Present Effectiveness of Control and Prospects for the Immediate Future

Economic Aggregates

A. Gross National Product Distributed by Type of Industry

B. Size and Breakdown of the National Government Budget

C. Financial Statistics

1. Price indices and the level of price

. Financial and Fiscal System

A. Brief Description of Nature and Function

. Trade

A. External Trade

1. Imports
2. Exports

B. Internal Trade

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Human Resources

A. Size and Geographical Distribution of the Population

B. Occupied Population

1. Geographical Distribution

2. Occupational Distribution

3. Industrial Distribution

C. Scientific, Technical and Other Specialized Training

. Agriculture (including agricultural processing)

A. Brief Description of the Nature and Uses of the Principal Products

B. Amounts Produced

C. Principal Locations of the Production

D. Amounts Consumed Internally; Amounts Exported

. Economic Services

A. Transportation

1. Brief description of existing facilities

2. Capacity of existing facilities

3. Construction of additional facilities

B. Communications

1. Brief description of existing facilities

2. Construction of additional facilities

C. Electric Power

1. Brief description of existing facilities

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TAB C

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SUBJECTS COVERED BY ORR PROJECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

I. Projects in Process or Completed, 1952

A. Completed, 1952

Petroleum (Part A)
Shipbuilding

B. In Progress, 1952

Petroleum (Part B)
Economic Organization
Armament, Input Requirements

II. Projects Planned for the Calendar Year 1953

A. Projects Devoted Entirely to Communist China

Aircraft including Engines
Ammunition, Input Requirements
Engineering Industries
Electric Systems, Manchuria
Electric Power, Communist China
Industrial Labor Force
Railroad Construction
Transportation - Organization, Traffic and Statistics (3)
Foreign Trade (2)
Balance of Payments
Organization of Selected Industries (2)
Economic Organization, North Korea
Economic Estimates Handbook
Economic Development (2)
Agriculture (2)
Ferrous Metals

B. Projects Dealing in Part with Communist China

(As a rough approximation, 10 percent of this research effort will be devoted to Communist China.)

Carbon and Graphite Electrodes
Railroad Equipment, Inputs

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Oil Refining and Chemical Processing Equipment
Metallurgical Equipment
Automotive Equipment
Storage and Primary Batteries
Radar and Electronic Equipment (5)
Communications Equipment (2)
Electrical Machinery and Equipment (6)
Gas Turbines
Machine Tools (2)
Textile Equipment
Forges and Presses (2)
Aircraft Production Machinery
Armament, Production and Trade (3)
Combat and Field Maintenance Equipment (2)
Agriculture and Forestry (8)
Ferrous Metals and Ferro-alloys (7)
Non-ferrous Metals
Rayon Tire Cord
Carbon Black
Bead Wire
Thermosetting Type Plates
Synthetic Plastics
Metallurgical Coke
Manufactured Gas
Coke Chemicals
Gasification of Coal

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate number of projects planned relating to these subjects.

21 October 1952

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